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FOR THE CRIMINAL PRACTITIONER
This review of significant Fourth Circuit criminal opinions is the second
in a series' and covers calendar year 1992. Both published and unpublished
opinions are reviewed; however, because unpublished opinions are not
binding precedent, it is the published authority cited in unpublished slip
opinions which is reviewed and discussed here. Only when recently published
opinions are read in light of foundational propositions and principles
repeatedly cited in unpublished opinions-which represent a majority of the
Fourth Circuit's criminal cases-can it be predicted with any confidence
how the Fourth Circuit will decide a particular issue.
I. PUBLISHED OPINIONS
A. DRUG CAsES
1. Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE). In United States v. McHan,
966 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld a CCE prosecution which
relied upon a prior drug conspiracy conviction as one of the required
predicate acts, citing United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992); Garrett
v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985); and United States v. Arnoldt, 947
F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992). The court
found unpersuasive the defendant's argument that reliance upon the prior
drug conspiracy conviction to which he had pled guilty constituted double
jeopardy. For further discussion of CCE prosecutions, see infra paragraph
II.A.
2. Drug Conspiracies/Sufficiency of Evidence. For further discussion
of drug conspiracies, see infra paragraph II.A.2. In United States v. Brooks,
957 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3051 (1992), the drug
conspiracy conviction was affirmed. Among the key points made en route
to affirmance were the following:
a. Slight Evidence. "Once it has been shown that a conspiracy
exists, the evidence need only establish a slight connection between
the defendant and the conspiracy to support conviction." Brooks,
957 F.2d at 1147 (citing United States v. Seni, 662 F.2d 277, 285
n.7 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982)).
b. No Kfiowledge/Minor Role. A defendant need not have knowl-
edge of his co-conspirators, or of the details of the conspiracy, and
may be convicted despite having played only a minor role in the
overall conspiracy. Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1147 (citations omitted).
On this point, see also Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539,
556-57 (1947) (co-conspirators need not know one another).
c. Quantity of Drugs. The quantity of drugs found by the district
court to be involved in a drug conspiracy need only be supported
1. The first review, published in 49 WAsH. & LEE L. RE,. 727 (1992), covered the nine
month period ending March 31, 1992. Forthcoming reviews will cover each calendar year, thus
eliminating duplication of coverage in the future.
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by a preponderance of the evidence, and will be affirmed on appeal
unless found to be "clearly erroneous." Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1148
(citations omitted). For further discussion of the quantity of drugs,
the standard of review on appeal, and related issues, see infra
paragraph II.A.3.
d. Seller of Drugs. A seller of drugs in a drug conspiracy is not
a "minor participant" as defined by Sentencing Guidelines Section
3B1.2(b). Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1149 (citations omitted).
e. Transactions with Government Agents. Drug defendants are
responsible for sentencing purposes for quantities of drugs to be
sold to, or purchased from, undercover Government agents. Brooks,
957 F.2d at 1151-52 (citations omitted).
f. Possession of Firearm by Co-Defendant. It is appropriate for a
defendant to have his sentence enhanced per Sentencing Guidelines
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) for the possession of a firearm by a co-con-
spirator. Brooks, 957 F.2d at 1148-49 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). See generally United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 351 (1992); United States v. Morgan,
942 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427
(4th Cir. 1989).
3. More Than Bad Friends. In United States v. Bell, 954 F.2d 232
(4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence showed little more
than "association between two persons, even if one has a fixed intent known
to the other to commit an unlawful act." Id. at 236 (quoting United States
v. Giunta, 925 F.2d 758, 764 (4th Cir. 1991)). In reversing Bell's conviction,
the court concluded that his "most heinous crime [was] choosing the wrong
friends. More than mere association with bad people who are committing
crimes is required for a conspiracy conviction." Id. at 237.
4. Purity of Drugs/Mandatory Minimums. In United States v. Rusher,
966 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held that in determining whether
the five year mandatory minimum sentence applies, the amount of pure
methamphetanine is found by multiplying the total quantity times its purity.
Thus, per the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii), if the quotient
is ten grams or more, the mandatory minimum does apply. See also United
States v. Stoner, 927 F.2d 45 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 129 (1991).
5. Maintaining Place for Drug Manufacture or Distribution. In United
States v. Midgett, 972 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held that in a
prosecution for maintaining a place for drug manufacture or distribution
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1), the drug quantity table, U.S.S.G. §
2D1I.1(c), is not used to enhance a defendant's offense level.
6. Relevant Conduct. In United States v. Williams, 977 F.2d 866 (4th
Cir. 1992), the court applied the "relevant conduct" provisions of U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) (defendant's possession and distribution of drugs not in count
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of conviction included to determine base offense level if part of same course
of conduct, or common scheme or plan) and held:
a. Standard on Appeal. Determination that additional drugs should
be included as "relevant conduct" is factual in nature and is
reviewed on appeal under a "clearly erroneous" standard. See
United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 881 (4th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 806 (4th Cir. 1989); United States
v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 1989).
b. Witness Credibility. "[T]he district court's findings as to rele-
vant conduct [are reviewed] with due deference to the trial court's
opportunity to assess [witness] credibility." Williams, 977 F.2d at
870.
c. Pretrial Disclosure of Government's Contentions. The Govern-
ment is not required to give pretrial disclosure of the quantity of
drugs it contends should be attributed to a particular defendant as
"relevant conduct." The court cited United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1703 (1991)
(defendant need not be informed of Sentencing Guidelines range
before Rule 11 proceedings); and United States v. Henry, 893 F.2d
46 (3d Cir. 1990); and United States v. Strickland, 725 F. Supp.
878 (E.D.N.C. 1989).
7. Possessing Marijuana Plants. A significant change in the law came
in United States v. Hash, 956 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1992), which struck down
Sentencing Guidelines Section 2Dl.1(c)n (as applied to a defendant charged
with possessing less than fifty marijuana plants). The court held that the
Sentencing Guidelines were inconsistent with the applicable statute, 21
U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(D), thus joining the Eighth Circuit in requiring that the
actual weight of the marijuana plants be used in sentencing, rather than
the greater projected weight (once the marijuana plants grow to maturity).
However, in United States v. Underwood, 970 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1992),
the court upheld the Sentencing Guidelines calculation (one plant equals
one kilogram of marijuana) where a larger number of plants are involved,
citing recent cases in six other circuits which have reached the same conclu-
sion.
8. Acceptance of Responsibility/Continued Drug Use. In United States
v. Underwood, 970 F.2d 1336 (4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld a finding
of no "acceptance of responsibility" due to the defendant's continued use
of marijuana after a plea agreement was entered. See U.S.S.G. § 3El.l,
cmt. n.l(a) (in determining whether defendant has accepted responsibility,
consideration is to be given to whether defendant has terminated or with-
drawn from criminal conduct and associations).
9. Drugs and Firearms Issues. For drugs and firearms issues in pub-
lished opinions during calendar year 1992, see infra paragraphs I.C.2 (Use
of Firearm During and in Relation to Drug Trafficking) and I.C.3 (Firearm
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Enhancement/Sentencing Guidelines). For drugs and firearms issues arising
in unpublished opinions during the review period, see infra paragraphs
II.A.7 (Use of Firearm During and in Relation to Drug Trafficking) and
II.A.8 (Firearm Enhancement/Sentencing Guidelines).
10. Enhancement for Prior Drug Conviction. In United States v.
Campbell, 980 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held that a probationary
sentence subject to expunction under what is called a "deferral statute" is
a prior drug conviction for purposes of sentence enhancement under 21
U.S.C. § 841. The court in Campbell also declined to hold that either a
clerical error (citing the wrong subsection of the statute in the information
which must be filed per 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (1988)), or the court's failure
to engage in the colloquy required by 21 U.S.C. § 851(b), invalidated the
enhanced sentence. Id. at 252.
B. SENTENCING GuIDELINES IssuEs
1. Amount of Loss. For further discussion of amount of loss for
Sentencing Guidelines purposes, see infra paragraph II.B.2.
a. Amount of Loss/Value of Collateral/Payments. In United States
v. Baum, 974 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held the amount
of loss caused by a defendant's false representations in obtaining a
loan is "the amount of the loan not repaid at the time the offense
is discovered, reduced by the amount the lending institution has
recovered, or can expect to recover, from any assets pledged to
secure the loan"-rejecting the Government's position that the full
amount of the fraudulently obtained loan should be included.
However, if the repayment is really "akin to restitution," it should
be included in the relevant amount of loss for sentencing purposes.
United States v. Wilson, 980 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1992) (amount paid
by third party guarantor should be included in amount of loss, but
payments before false statement should be excluded unless related
to criminal conduct); United States v. Rothberg, 954 F.2d 217 (4th
Cir. 1992) (settlement payment made after loss was discovered
should be included in amount of loss for sentencing purposes); see
also United States v. Saunders, 957 F.2d 1488, 1494 (8th Cir. 1992)
(restitution paid by defendant's girlfriend included in amount of
loss), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 256, and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 991
(1993).
b. Lost Profits. In United States v. Bailey, 975 F.2d 1028 (4th
Cir. 1992), the court rejected the inclusion of profits lost by
defrauded investors in computing the amount of loss, holding that
only the lost principal is counted.
c. Unconvicted Offenses. Losses attributable to unconvicted offen-
ses are counted as "relevant conduct" in computing the amount of
loss so long as they are "part of the same course of conduct or
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common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. §
1B1.3(a)(2). See United States v. Williams, 880 F.2d 804, 806 (4th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357, 363 (lst Cir. 1989).
2. Role in the Offense(Organizer/Leader/Manager/Supervisor). In
United States v. Kincaid, 964 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld a
two-level increase in offense level under § 3BI.I(c), holding that direction
of the activity of a single co-conspirator was sufficient to support the
enhancement. Role in the offense enhancements are reviewed on appeal
under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Campbell, 935
F.2d 39, 46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 348 (1991); United States v.
Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 432 (1990);
United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 1989). For further
discussion of role in the offense enhancements, see infra paragraph II.B.4.
Similarly, in United States v. Harriott, 976 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir.
1992), the court reversed a finding by the district court that the defendant
was not an organizer or leader where he drove a single "mule" carrying
crack cocaine from New York to Virginia and generally directed her illegal
activity.
3. Abuse of Position of Trust. See United States v. Helton, 953 F.2d
867, 869 (4th Cir. 1992) (abuse of trust enhancement not appropriate where
defendant's duties are "functionally equivalent to that of 'an ordinary bank
teller'). For further discussion of this enhancement, see infra paragraph
II.B.5.
4. Obstruction of Justice. In United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138,
1149 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3051 (1992), the court reversed
imposition of a two-level enhancement for "obstruction of justice" per
§ 3C1.1 based solely on statements to a third party by the defendant that
he would kill a witness or his family if the witness "rolled over" on him.
The court reasoned that such statements would only support an obstruction
of justice enhancement if made in the presence of the threatened party or
"in circumstances in which there is some likelihood that the co-defendant,
witness, or juror will learn of the threat."
In United States v. Ashers, 968 F.2d 411 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 673 (1992), the court approved an obstruction of justice enhancement
for a defendant who intentionally disguised his voice when giving a voice
exemplar to a defense expert. Ashers also held that where two grounds are
cited by a district court for an obstruction enhancement, one proper
(disguising voice) and one improper (perjury, improper for the time being
under United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted,
112 S. Ct. 2272 (1992)), the obstruction enhancement can stand. Ashers
also included a lengthy list of conduct that warrants an obstruction en-
hancement, namely: lying to a probation officer about the amount of
attorney's fees paid; attempting to destroy evidence; giving a false name
and age in bond proceedings; refusing to provide financial information to
a probation officer; attempting to bribe a witness; refusing to provide
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handwriting exemplars; attempting to postpone trial by misrepresenting a
co-defendant's health and firing attorney; requesting a co-defendant to
withhold information from law enforcement personnel; and failure to appear
at sentencing.
In United States v. Melton, 970 F.2d 1328 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
upheld an obstruction enhancement for an attempted escape from federal
custody. The court in Melton also upheld a denial of a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility, citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Application Note 4.
(enhancement for obstruction of justice "ordinarily indicates that the de-
fendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct").
For further discussion of obstruction of justice, see infra paragraph
II.B.6.
5. Acceptance of Responsibility. Another Sentencing Guidelines issue
frequently litigated on appeal is whether a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility (per § 3El.1) should have been granted. Whether a particular
defendant has accepted responsibility is primarily a factual question review-
able on appeal under a "clearly erroneous" standard. United States v.
Cusack, 901 F.2d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Daughtrey, 874
F.2d 213, 217 (4th Cir. 1989). For further discussion of acceptance of
responsibility, see infra paragraph II.B.7.
a. Unlikely if Obstruction of Justice. In United States v. Melton,
970 F.2d 1328, 1335-36 (4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld denial of
a reduction for acceptance of responsibility to a defendant who had
received an obstruction of justice enhancement for attempted escape,
citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Application Note 4 (enhancement for
obstruction of justice "ordinarily indicates that the defendant has
not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct").
b. Requiring Cooperation. In United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d
1076, 1087 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1028 (1993),
the court upheld conditioning the acceptance of responsibility re-
duction on a defendant's waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege
and full cooperation with the Government's ongoing investigation
and prosecution. Frazier includes a lengthy discussion of the cases
which have reversed any penalty for the exercise of Fifth Amend-
ment rights, contrasting this well-established principle with the line
of authority upholding lesser sentences pursuant to plea bargains
for defendants who plead guilty and/or cooperate. See, e.g., Corbitt
v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218-24 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,
30-31 (1973); North Carolina v. Alford, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970); United States v. Mourn-
ing, 914 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Trujillo, 906
F.2d 1456 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 396 (1990); United
States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (lth Cir. 1989).
c. Incomplete Acceptance. In United States v. Harriott, 976 F.2d
198, 202 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
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court's finding of acceptance of responsibility where the defendant
did little more after a jury trial than "agreed that he had been
convicted."
6. Career Offenders/Criminal History. In United States v. Sanders,
954 F.2d 227, 231-32 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held that prior convictions
for two separate violent crimes (armed robbery and murder) made the
defendant a career offender,- rejecting the defendant's argument that the
convictions should be merged because both had a single cause, that is, the
defendant's drug addiction when the crimes were committed.
In United States v. Jones, 977 F.2d 105 (4th Cir. 1992), after reversing
the district court's finding that the defendant was a career offender and
remanding to consider the defendant's challenge of a prior conviction in
United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 683 (1991) (Jones 1), the court reversed the district court's finding on
remand that the defendant was not a career offender. (As humorist Dave
Barry might say, "I am not kidding.") The court in Jones 11 set forth a
rather elaborate process for questioning the constitutionality of prior con-
victions, pointing out as it had earlier in United States v. Davenport, 884
F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1989), that the burden is on a defendant to show
the invalidity of a prior conviction.
In United States v. Wilson, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 30,784 (4th Cir.
Nov. 23, 1992), the court held that a conviction for writing a check on a
closed account counted as a conviction in determining Criminal History
Category. The court distinguished writing a check on a closed or nonexistent
account from writing a check for which there are insufficient funds, expressly
excluded from criminal history considerations by U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1).
See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1), cmt. n.13 (checks passed using false name or
on non-existent account do count in determining defendant's Criminal
History Category).
For further discussion of career offender status, see infra paragraph
II.B.8.
7. Downward Departures. For further discussion of downward depar-
tures, see infra paragraph II.B.9.
a. Due to Family Responsibilities. In United States v. Bell, 974
F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed a downward departure
in a child pornography case because of the effect incarceration
would have on the defendant's family (citing U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6
"[F]amily ties and responsibilities and community ties are not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be
outside the guidelines"). See also United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d
31, 33 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 585 (1990) (unextraordinary
family circumstances do not justify downward departure); United
States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1446 (4th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
927 (1990). In a touch of irony apparently missed by the district
court, Bell's conviction was for the sexual exploitation of children
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in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251; the case initiated on a complaint
by a seven-year old girl and the subject offense involved, inter alia,
the surreptitious filming in the nude of the defendant's own daughter
and her friends, then ages seven through thirteen.
b. Due to Disparate Sentences of Co-Conspirators/Co-Defendants.
In United States v. Ellis, 975 F.2d 1061, 1066 (4th Cir. 1992), the
court held that disparate sentences of co-conspirators caused by
prosecutorial charging decisions and plea bargains are not a proper
basis for a downward departure. The Fourth Circuit had held
previously that disparate sentences of co-defendants were not a
proper basis for an upward departure. See United States v. Mc-
Kenley, 895 F.2d 184, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1990). In Ellis, the Fourth
Circuit applied the same logic to downward departures, citing United
States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1585 (1992); United States v. Wogan, 938 F.2d 1446,
1448-49 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 441 (1991); and United
States v. Joyner, 924 F.2d 454, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1991). Likewise, in
United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 864 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
held that disparate state sentences of co-conspirators not prosecuted
federally are not a proper basis for a downward departure.
c. Criminal History Category Overstates Seriousness of Criminal
History. In United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 866 (4th Cir. 1992),
the court held that while a Criminal History Category which over-
states the seriousness of a defendant's criminal history may be a
proper basis for a downward departure, citing U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3
and United States v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1990),
unless the district court misunderstands its own discretion its decision
not to so depart is not appealable. See United States v. Bayerle,
898 F.2d 28, 30-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 65 (1990).
8. Upward Departures. For further discussion of upward departures,
see infra paragraph II.B.10.
a. For Related But Unconvicted Murder. In United States v.
Melton, 970 F.2d 1328 (4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld an upward
departure in a drug case for a related but unconvicted murder. The
court held that the murder need only be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence, citing United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81, 85
(4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084 (1990), and found the
upward departure consistent with the test for upward departures set
forth in United States v. Hummer, 916 F.2d 186, 192 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1608 (1991); also see United States
v. Rivalta, 892 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
215 (1991).
b. For Old, Uncounted Convictions. In United States v. Rusher,
966 F.2d 868, 881-82 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 351 (1992),
the court held that convictions too old to consider in computing a
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defendant's criminal history category are a proper basis for an
upward departure, whether or not the old convictions provide
evidence of "similar misconduct"-an issue which had been specif-
ically reserved for future consideration by the Supreme Court in
Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992). The Fourth
Circuit joined the First and the Tenth Circuits in so holding. See
United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 72-73 (1st Cir. 1991); United
States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th Cir. 1990). Rusher
includes a detailed description of what a district court must deter-
mine to justify an upward departure and an equally detailed artic-
ulation of the standard of appellate review of each step of the
required process.
c. To Career Offenders. In United States v. Cash, No. 91-5869,
1992 WL 365342 (4th Cir. Dec. 14, 1992), the court upheld an
upward departure to career offender status where the defendant's
criminal history category underrepresented his past criminal conduct.
In Jones the defendant would have been a career offender but for
one of his prior convictions being found constitutionally invalid.
9. Aggravated Assault with Weapon. In United States v. Williams,
954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed and remanded for resent-
encing the district court's refusal to impose a four-level upward adjustment,
per § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B), for use of a dangerous weapon in an aggravated
assault. The district court based its refusal to enhance on the erroneous
assumption that further increasing the offense level for aggravated assault
(for the use of a gun) constituted impermissible "double counting." To the
contrary, reasoned the Fourth Circuit, if the Sentencing Guidelines had not
anticipated double counting in aggravated assaults with a gun, the further
firearm enhancement would have been specifically excluded.
10. Offenses Committed While on Release. In United States v. Kincaid,
964 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld an enhancement of the
defendant's sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147 and U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7
for an offense committed while on pretrial release, rejecting the defendant's
claim that the enhancement violated either due process or the guarantee
against double jeopardy.
11. Fines. In United States v. Salama, 974 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1992),
the court upheld findings that the defendant, an Egyptian citizen, had raised
overseas funds to start a criminal (counterfeit) enterprise, and that funds
or assets might be forthcoming from an unrelated foreign investment, as
sufficient under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(a) to support a 25,000 dollar fine-even
though the district court said just before imposing it, "I have doubts that
any fine is collectable. . . ." Salama, 974 F.2d at 523.
In United States v. Gresham, 964 F.2d 1426 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
upheld a fine of 80,200 dollars based, in part, on the defendant's equity in
a home owned jointly with his wife, rejecting the defendant's argument that
because the interest in a tenancy by the entirety was not severable it should
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not be considered. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the
fine violated 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d) in that it was not due on a date certain
within five years. To the contrary, reasoned the court, since no installment
payments were set up the fine is understood to be payable immediately by
virtue of the express provisions of § 3572(d).
12. Restitution. In United States v. Mullins, 971 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir.
1992), the court held that "consequential damages" caused by the defen-
dant's criminal conduct (here, attorney's and investigator's fees) cannot be
ordered in restitution under the Victim Witness Protection Act, unlike the
costs of repair of damaged real property which are recoverable. The court
in Mullins remanded for the findings of fact required by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a)
and United States v. Bruchey, 810 F.2d 456, 458 (4th Cir. 1987).
In United States v. Bailey, 975 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
held that an order of restitution is improper unless a defendant can possibly
comply. As Bailey pointed out, this "does not preclude a sentencing judge
from ordering an indigent defendant to pay restitution. Indigence is not
necessarily a permanent condition. However, the court must make a factual
determination that the defendant can feasibly comply with the order without
undue hardship to himself or his dependents." Id. at 1032 (citations omit-
ted).
For further discussion of restitution, see infra paragraph II.B. 11.
13. Government's Right to Put on Evidence. In United States v.
Kincaid, 964 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held denial of the Govern-
ment's motion for a continuance (to respond to a defendant's surprise,
untimely objection to material facts in his presentence report) was an abuse
of the district court's discretion, reversing and remanding for further pro-
ceedings. See FED. R. Cxn. P. 32(a)(1); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3, cmt.
14. Supervised Release. In United States v. Parriett, 974 F.2d 523 (4th
Cir. 1992), the court held that upon revoking a previously imposed period
of supervised release, a district court has no authority to impose another
term of supervised release. See United States v. Cooper, 962 F.2d 339 (4th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Holmes, 954 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Behnezhad, 907 F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1990).
In United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth
Circuit held that transcription of the court's oral findings at the conclusion
of an evidentiary hearing after which the defendant's supervised release was
revoked was a sufficient "written statement" for due process purposes.
C. Fm mgs OrFNSES
1. Possession of Firearm by Felon.
a. Civil Rights Restored. In United States v. Haynes, 961 F.2d 50
(4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed the defendant's conviction for
being a felon in possession of a firearm, following United States v.
McBryde, 938 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1991), in holding that a defendant
whose civil rights have been restored under state law cannot sub-
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sequently be prosecuted federally under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See
United States v. McLean, 904 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 203 (1990).
b. Not "Crime of Violence". In United States v. Samuels, 970
F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1992), the court again held that mere possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)-'"absent aggravating circumstances charged in the indict-
ment"-is not a "crime of violence" for career offender purposes.
Id. at 1315; see United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 110, 113 (4th
Cir. 1991).
c. Constructive Possession. In United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106
(4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed a felon in possession of a firearm
conviction due to insufficient evidence of constructive possession.
The facts essentially were that a police officer observed the defen-
dant's shoulder dip as he approached the vehicle in which the
defendant was a front seat passenger. When the vehicle was searched,
the firearm was found under the defendant's seat. After carefully
reviewing the law of constructive possession, the court reversed,
explaining its holding thus: "[w]e emphasize that the facts of this
case fall outside, but just barely, the realm of the quantum of
evidence necessary to support a finding of constructive possession."
Id. at 108.
2. Use of Firearm During and in Relation to Drug Trafficking.
a. Short-Barreled Shotgun. In United States v. Hall, 972 F.2d 67
(4th Cir. 1992), the court held that possession of a short-barreled
shotgun during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime carries
a ten-year mandatory sentence, rejecting defendant's argument that
the statutory definition of "short-barreled shotgun" in 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(6) was too ambiguous to support the additional penalty.
The court ruled that any shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen
inches long or with an overall length of less than twenty-six inches
falls within the prohibited statutory category to which the additional
penalty applies.
b. Guns at Home of Co-Conspirator. In United States v. Peay,
972 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3479 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1993), the court upheld admission into evidence (and
§ 924(c) conviction based upon) guns seized from the home of a
co-conspirator. See United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d
1006, 1018 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Zarintash, 736 F.2d
66, 72 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Mourad, 729 F.2d 195, 201
(2d Cir. 1984).
c. Failure to Allege Scienter. In United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d
476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 171 (1992), the court found
sufficient an indictment which failed to allege that a § 924(c)
violation was "knowingly" committed. In part because of the
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standard of review when first argued on appeal set forth in Finn
v. United States, 256 F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1958) ("[i]ndictments
... are construed more liberally ... and every indictment is then
indulged in support of the sufficiency" when first challenged on
appeal), the court held the failure to allege scienter insufficient to
require reversal. This limited scienter which must ordinarily be
proven (that is, a "knowing" violation) is distinguished from knowl-
edge that possessing the firearm is against the law, which need not
be proven. On this latter point, see United States v. Santiesteban,
825 F.2d 779, 782 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that ignorance of law is
not defense in prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); United States
v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 320-21 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 323 (1991) (holding that no defense in § 922(g) prosecution that
state judge had told defendant he could possess firearms for hunting
purposes).
3. Firearm Enhancement/Sentencing Guidelines. In addition to pros-
ecution under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for the use of firearms during or in
relation to drug trafficking crimes, the Sentencing Guidelines provide for
the enhancement of drug sentences where weapons are present "unless it is
clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense."
U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.1, cmt. n.3. In United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th
Cir. 1992), the court upheld such an enhancement in spite of the fact that
a co-defendant admitted owning the weapons. See United States v. Brooks,
957 F.2d 1138, 1148-49 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d
243 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th Cir.
1989).
4. Armed Career Criminals.
a. Offenses Consolidated for Sentencing. In United States v. Sa-
muels, 970 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held that offenses
consolidated for sentencing are nevertheless treated as separate
convictions for Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. § 924(e))
purposes. See United States v. Mason, 954 F.2d 219 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1979 (1992); United States v. Bolton, 905 F.2d
319, 323 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Schieman, 894 F.2d 909,
912 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wallace, 889 F.2d 580, 584
(5th Cir. 1989).
b. Breaking and Entering as "Crime of Violence". In United
States v. Bowden, 975 F.2d 1080 (4th Cir. 1992), the court applied
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) ("[A] person has been
convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he
has been convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition
or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry
into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit
a crime"), to the North Carolina statute prohibiting breaking or
entering. The court in Bowden held that convictions under the
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North Carolina statute (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54) do qualify as
generic burglary convictions under Taylor and therefore properly
support an Armed Career Criminal enhancement. The First Circuit
in United States v. Anderson, 921 F.2d 335, 340 (lst Cir. 1990)
came to the same conclusion with respect to convictions under the
North Carolina statute.
c. Maximum Penalty: Life. In. United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d
106, 107 (4th Cir. 1992), the court implicitly acknowledged what is
not expressly provided in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), that the unstated
statutory maximum penalty for a violation of the Armed Career
Criminal Act is life imprisonment.
5. Title 26 Charges. In United States v. Aiken, 974 F.2d 446 (4th Cir.
1992), the court upheld a prosecution for possession of an unregistered
short-barreled shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), rejecting the
defendant's argument that to so use a taxing statute was unconstitutional
in that the Government would not have allowed him to register the short-
barreled shotgun and pay a tax.
In United States v. Daniels, 973 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
reversed the defendant's conviction for transferring a firearm in violation
of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5812(a) and 5861(e) due to the insufficiency of the charging
language in the indictment. The Fourth Circuit found fatal the failure to
charge that the sawed-off shotgun had been made "in violation of the
provisions of this chapter," even though the specific section in the chapter
which was violated was cited.
In United States v. Council, 973 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1992), the
court held that the Government need not prove scienter in a prosecution
for possessing unregistered firearms and explosives in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 5861(d) and 5871, that is, the Government need not prove that the
defendant knew the firearms and explosives were unregistered. The court
cited United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
D. SEARCH AND SEIzuRE
1. Pretextual Stops/Expectation of Privacy in Vehicle and Wife's
Purse. In United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
held that a traffic stop for seat belt and potential license tag violations
followed by a consent to search and discovery of drugs was not "pretex-
tual." The court in Rusher also held that only the owner (i.e., none of the
passengers) had a reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to items found
in the vehicle, citing United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 374-75 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985), and that a man does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his wife's purse.
2. Suppression Hearings: Extent of District Court's De Novo Review.
In United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held
that a defendant is entitled to full de novo review of the magistrate's
findings and recommendation regarding any suppression motion, whether
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or not issues or evidence presented to the district court were raised before
the magistrate. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988); Wimmer v. Cook,
774 F.2d 68, 75 (4th Cir. 1985); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199-200
(4th Cir. 1983). However, if objections are not filed seeking the required
de novo review of the magistrate's findings, further appellate review is
waived. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984).
3. Expectation of Privacy in Vehicle Exterior and Interior/Inevitable
Discovery/Vehicle Inventory Searches/Good Faith Exception. Once recog-
nizing the defendant's right to de novo and appellate review, however, the
Fourth Circuit proceeded in United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113 (4th
Cir. 1992), to reverse the district court's suppression of certain evidence,
holding: (a) that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in tires or
other exterior parts of vehicles, citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 39 (1988); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979); and Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967); (b) that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the interior of a vehicle visible from the exterior,
citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986); and Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983) (plurality opinion); (c) that the "inevitable dis-
covery" of hack saw blades in the tool box in the defendant's trunk may
justify its admission into evidence-if the district court finds on remand
that it would, in fact, have been found in a standard vehicle inventory
search, citing in regard to "inevitable discovery," Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S.
431, 439 (1984); United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207, 210-11 (4th Cir.
1992); and United States v. Whitehorn, 813 F.2d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988), and citing in regard to inventory searches
of vehicles and containers within them, California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct.
1982, 1991 (1991); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990); and Colorado
v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987); and (d) that boots found in a separate
search of defendant's residence pursuant to a defective search warrant should
be admitted into evidence under the "good faith exception" of United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In regard to the good faith exception
generally, see Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 355 (1987).
4. Motel Room of Known Drug Dealer/Deference to Magistrate's
Finding of Probable Cause. In United States v. Williams, 974 F.2d 480 (4th
Cir. 1992), the court held reliable information that a known drug dealer
was renting a particular motel room sufficient to support a search warrant.
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's suppression
of evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant, faulting the lower court
for failure to give proper deference to the magistrate's finding of probable
cause. On the deference due the magistrate's findings, see United States v.
Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hodges,
705 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir. 1983).
5. Warrantless Searches: Good Faith Exception/Exigent Circum-
stances/Emergency Doctrine. On the other hand, in United States v. Moss,
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963 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed the district court for not
suppressing evidence discovered "in plain view" during an unlawful war-
rantless search. The court refused to apply the "good faith exception" to
uphold a warrantless search based upon an officer's mistaken, but "good
faith" belief that the search was justified. On this point, see also Illinois
v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2800 (1990). The court in Moss also discussed
and rejected the "exigent circumstances" and "emergency doctrine" excep-
tions to the general warrant requirement, as inapplicable to the facts of this
case.
6. State or Federal Search. Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that a federal search warrant be obtained from a federal
magistrate or "a state court of record." This excludes most state magistrates
who routinely authorize state search warrants. In United States v. Williams,
977 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1992), however, the court held that the involvement
of a single federal agent in obtaining a state search warrant and the fact
that the offense was ultimately prosecuted federally did not trigger the
application of Rule 41(a), applying the test set forth in United States v.
Smith, 914 F.2d 565, 569 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 999
(1991) (test is whether search warrant application is made "at the direction
or urging of a federal officer"). See also United States v. MacConnell, 868
F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bookout, 810 F.2d 965, 967 (10th
Cir. 1987).
E. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Enforcement of Subpoenas.
a. Subpoena of Corporate and Personal Business Documents/Fifth
Amendment Privilege. In United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909 (4th
Cir. 1992), the court upheld enforcement of subpoenas duces tecum
to produce desk and pocket calendars, appointment books, planner
schedules, daily meeting logs, miscellaneous records of a closely
held corporation owned solely by one of the defendants, and records
regarding a personally owned beach home. In regard to the business
records, the court held the defendants had failed to meet their
burden of establishing their "personal nature." Id. at 911. The
court took no stock in the defendant's argument that because he
was the sole owner of the corporation its affairs were really his
personal business, stating: "[the company] is a one-man operation;
however it is still a corporation ... that has a separate legal
existence from [the defendant] .... [The defendant] chose the cor-
porate form and gained its attendant benefits, and we hold, in
accord with the decisions of sister circuits, that he cannot now
disregard the corporate form to shield his business records from
production." Id. at 912 (citations omitted).
The court in Stone also enforced the subpoena of the beach
house records, described as "statements of the rental agent, bills.
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for public utilities, the telephone company, and the power com-
pany," finding them "unprotected by the privilege against self-
incrimination because their existence, possession, and authentication
are a 'foregone conclusion' [and] their production 'adds little or
nothing to the sum total of the Government's information."' Id.
at 911 (citations omitted).
b. Subpoena of the Press. In In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850 (4th Cir.
1992), the court upheld enforcement of subpoenas of four reporters
to testify at the bribery (Hobbs Act) trial of a South Carolina
legislator snared in Operation Lost Trust and affirmed a district
court order holding the reporters in contempt for refusing to testify.
Both Judge Niemeyer's majority opinion and Judge Wilkinson's
concurring opinion are required reading for those encountering this
issue in the future. On subpoenas of the press generally, see Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); United States v. Caporale, 806
F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021 (1987);
LaRouche v. National Broadcasting Co., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d
70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted); United States v. Steelham-
mer, 561 F.2d 539 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc); Stickels v. General
Rental Co., 750 F. Supp. 729, 731-32 (E.D. Va. 1990) (discussing
cases).
2. Use Immunity. In United States v. Harris, 973 F.2d 333 (4th Cir.
1992), the court affirmed dismissal of most of the charges in the indictment,
holding that the Government had not met its burden of showing a source
or sources for the evidence independent of the defendant's immunized
cooperation. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
Likewise, in United States v. Smith, 976 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1992), the
court reversed the defendant's conviction as a breach of an agreement not
to prosecute the defendant "for any federal offense based on information
now in the possession of the government." As the court noted in Smith,
whether an immunity agreement has been breached is reviewed on appeal
de novo. Id. at 863; see also United States v. Blackburn, 940 F.2d 107, 109
(4th Cir. 1991).
In United States v. Fant, 974 F.2d 559 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
reversed and remanded an extortion conviction for resentencing without an
enhancement for obstruction based upon the defendant's statements to his
probation officer after being promised use immunity for any cooperation.
Because the defendant failed to raise the issue on appeal, the court was
required to find "plain error" to reverse per United States v. Maxton, 940
F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 398 (1991), which it did.
But cf. United States v. Reckmeyer, 786 F.2d 1216, 1224 (4th Cir.)
(promise by Government not to use information in further prosecutions did
not prevent its use in that prosecution), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986).
And in United States v. Seeright, 978 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
upheld use of the defendant's statements made during a proffer meeting
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after the defendant's material breach of the plea agreement-in spite of the
fact that the defendant was not represented by counsel when he made the
statements. Accord United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976).
3. Double Jeopardy. In United States v. McHan, 966 F.2d 134 (4th
Cir. 1992), the court held that a 1984-86 conspiracy was separate and
distinct from a 1988 conspiracy, and that the guarantee against double
jeopardy did not prevent further using these two conspiracies as predicate
offenses to prosecuting the defendant for conducting a continuing criminal
enterprise (CCE). See also United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, reh'g
denied, 113 S. Ct. 13 (1992); Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985);
United States v. Arnoldt, 947 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1991) (RICO prosecution
not barred by earlier convictions on some of predicate acts), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992).
In United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
found no double jeopardy violation in following criminal prosecution with
asset forfeiture proceedings against the defendant's property. Accord United
States v. McCaslin, 959 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
382 (1992); United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992); see also United States v. Santoro, 866
F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989) (asset forfeiture not cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of Eighth Amendment).
For a case with an unexpected double jeopardy twist, see United States
v. Council, 973 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1992) (counts on which Rule 29 motion
was granted really in nature of dismissal on legal grounds and therefore
may be tried again, but counts mistried on Government's motion during
jury deliberations may not).
For further discussion of double jeopardy, see infra paragraph II.D.3.
4. Sufficiency of Indictment. In United States v. Daniels, 973 F.2d
272 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1064 (1993), the court reversed
the defendant's conviction for transferring a firearm in violation of 26
U.S.C. §§ 5812(a) and 5861(e) due to the insufficiency of the charging
language in the indictment. The Fourth Circuit found fatal the failure to
charge that the defendant transferred a sawed off shotgun "in violation of
the provisions of this chapter," even though the specific section in the
chapter that was violated was cited. For sufficiency of indictments generally,
see Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 760-64 (1962); United States v.
Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1239 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 842
(1988) ("[A] statutory citation does not ensure that the grand jury has
considered and found all essential elements of the offense charged"); and
United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1227 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
On the other hand, in United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.
1992), the court rejected the defendant's argument-raised for the first time
on appeal-that failure to allege scienter in charging a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) was constitutionally insufficient. The court, acknowledging
the less stringent standard in post-verdict challenges, held "that in alleging
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that Sutton 'did carry and use' a firearm, the indictment sufficiently
imparted knowledge of the essential facts of the crime," citing United States
v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Purvis, 580 F.2d
853, 859 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 914 (1979). See also Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d
304, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1958).
For further discussion of sufficiency of an indictment, see infra para-
graph II.D.44.
5. Venue. In United States v. Gilliam, 975 F.2d 1050, 1057 (4th Cir.
1992), the court held that "an offense committed in more than one district
may be prosecuted in any district that such offense was begun, continued,
or completed," citing 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). The court also held that "a
conspiracy may be prosecuted in any district in which the agreement was
formed or in which an act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed,"
citing United States v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 508, 511 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 976 (1982). See also United States v. Barfield, 969 F.2d 1554,
1557 (4th Cir. 1992); Lord v. United States, 412 F.2d 499, 500-01 (4th Cir.
1969).
Venue challenges cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; failure
to raise venue objections in district court constitutes waiver. United States
v. Santiesteban, 825 F.2d 779, 783 (4th Cir. 1987).
6. Competency Hearings. In United States v. Barfield, 969 F.2d 1554,
1556-57 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held that a defendant has a right to be
present, and to be represented by counsel, at a competency hearing, which
is "a critical stage" of criminal proceedings. However, if the defendant is,
in fact, competent, his absence or nonrepresentation at the competency
hearing is harmless error.
In United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431 (4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld
the continued confinement of the defendant (pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246),
finding no clear error in the requisite dual proof: (1) that the defendant is
suffering from a mental condition or defect; and (2) that his release would
create a substantial risk of harm to the person or property of another. The
court in Cox also upheld the district court's order requiring the Government
to pay for a second, independent psychiatric evaluation per the provisions
of 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b), rejecting the Government's argument to the contrary
on cross-appeal.
7. Voluntariness of Confession/Lost Evidence. In United States v.
Sanders, 954 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1992), the court remanded an armed bank
robbery conviction, concluding that the defendant's confession was not
sufficiently purged of the taint of an earlier unlawful arrest and therefore
not voluntary. However, the court rejected the defendant's argument that
erasure of the bank surveillance videotape required dismissal of charges
against the defendant, citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)
for the proposition that, absent bad faith on the part of the Government,
failure to preserve potentially useful evidence is not a denial of due process.
FOR THE CRIMINAL PRACTITIONER
8. Motions to Withdraw Plea. In United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d
1389 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc), the court affirmed a 360-month sentence in
a child pornography case which involved a conspiracy to kidnap, sexually
molest, and murder a child on what is known as a "snuff film." The court
upheld the district court's refusal to allow defendant's withdrawal of the
plea when he learned that the Sentencing Guidelines range was not 78-108
months, as his attorney had advised him, but 360 months to life. Six of
the thirteen judges on the Fourth Circuit dissented in four different opinions.
Five of the six dissenters believed a "fair and just reason" had been shown;
a sixth, Judge Murnaghan, concurred in denial of the motion to withdraw,
but dissented as to the Sentencing Guidelines computation.
On a related point, it is clear in general that a court is not required to
calculate and disclose the sentencing guideline range prior to accepting a
defendant's plea. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 118 (4th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1403 (1992); see also United States v. McHan,
920 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990) (defendant not allowed to withdraw plea after
learning that his conviction might be used as predicate offense in continuing
criminal enterprise (CCE) charge).
For further discussion of motions to withdraw a plea, see infra para-
graph II.D.12.
9. Waiver of Right to Counsel. In United States v. Barfield, 969 F.2d
1554, 1558 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held there was no obligation to ask a
defendant who had waived his right to counsel and was representing himself
whether he wanted assistance of standby counsel who had been appointed
pursuant to McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984). On the constitutional
right of a defendant to waive counsel and proceed pro se, see Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 465
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1165 (1985); Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d
592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. King, 582 F.2d 888, 890 (4th Cir.
1978); United States v. Sacco, 571 F.2d 791, 793 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 999 (1978); United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305, 311 (10th Cir.
1977). On when a defendent has shown sufficient "good cause" to justify
appointment of substitute counsel, see United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d
105, 108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211 (1988). For further discussion
of waiver of counsel, see infra paragraph II.D.10.
10. Counsel's Motion to Withdraw. In United States v. Hanley, 974
F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1992), the court affirmed denial of counsel's motion to
withdraw filed one week before trial. In evaluating whether the district
court has abused its discretion in refusing to allow counsel to withdraw, an
appellate court considers: (1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the adequacy
of the district court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3) whether
the attorney/client conflict was so great that it had resulted in total lack
of communication preventing an adequate defense. For further discussion
of counsel's motion to withdraw, see infra paragraph II.D.11.
11. Government's Motion to Continue. In United States v. Colon, 975
F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
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refusal to grant a brief continuance (of a suppression hearing) to allow the
Government to locate a key witness, finding the requisite abuse of discretion
and prejudice.
On the district court's wide discretion regarding motions to continue
generally, see United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 735 (4th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Gaither, 527 F.2d 456, 457 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 952 (1976). However, the wide latitude allowed the court to control
its own docket is not unlimited. Bakker, 925 F.2d at 735; United States v.
Clinger, 681 F.2d 221, 223 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 912 (1982)
(when continuance is sought for purpose of locating witness, moving party
must show who witness is, nature and relevance of testimony, that witness
can probably be located, and that due diligence has been exercised to locate
witness).
12. Disclosure of Confidential Informant. United States v. Blevins,
.960 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1992) includes a lengthy discussion of the pertinent
cases and principles relative to when the identity of a confidential informant
must be disclosed. Disclosure was not required in Blevins. For further
discussion of this subject, see infra paragraph II.D.9.
13. Joinder and Severance. In United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138,
1145-46 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3051 (1992), discussed supra,
the court held that defendants' pretrial motions for severance had been
properly denied, pointing out that "[d]efendants who have been charged in
the same conspiracy indictment should ordinarily be tried together." Id. at
1145; see also United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 542 (4th Cir. 1981).
The court emphasized that no right to severance arises because the evidence
against one or more defendants is stronger than the evidence against other
defendants, which it observed to be true of most conspiracies. Denial of a
motion to sever will be reversed on appeal only for a "clear abuse of
discretion." Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); see also United
States v. Haney, 914 F.2d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 114 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Roberts, 881
F.2d 95, 102 (4th Cir. 1989); Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 665 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1011 (1989); United States v. Hargrove, 647
F.2d 411, 415 (4th Cir. 1981).
In United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 351 (1992), the court held the possibility that one defendant might
testify that he was solely responsible for the criminal conduct insufficient
to require severance. In such a case, the court held "[the defendant] must
first show a 'reasonable probability ... that the proffered testimony would,
in fact materialize' and that the 'co-defendant would have waived his Fifth
Amendment' right at a separate trial," citing United States v. Parodi, 703
F.2d 768, 779 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d
772, 778 (4th Cir. 1971)). Moreover, the court ruled, "[s]everance is not
required when the co-defendant would testify only if his case came first."
Rusher, 966 F.2d at 878.
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In United States v. Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
held that defendant's motion to sever the counts in the indictment (three
counts of possession of firearm and one count of possession of ammunition
by convicted felon) were properly denied. As the court in Samuels noted,
"[t]he general rule is that counts charged in the same indictment will be
joined at trial, see 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 222,
at 776 (1982), and [the defendant] has failed to carry his burden of
establishing that the denial of severance deprived him of a fair trial or
resulted in undue prejudice." Samuels, 970 F.2d at 1314 (citing United
States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221, 1225 (4th Cir. 1984)) and United States
v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 779-81 (4th Cir. 1983)).
For further discussion of joinder and severance, see infra paragraph
II.D.4.
14. Defendant's Absence at Trial. In United States v. Camacho, 955
F.2d 950 (4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed the defendant's conviction
because the district court proceeded with voir dire, opening statements, and
examination of one of the Government's witnesses in the defendant's
absence. The reason for the defendant's absence was not entirely clear,
although there was a snow storm in process, the defendant lived some
distance away, and he arrived about 50 minutes after the trial began. The
court discussed at length and distinguished those cases in which a defendant
is a fugitive, is voluntarily absent, or has otherwise waived his right to be
present for trial, before concluding that proceeding without the defendant
in this case was reversible error. For cases finding the defendant's absence
at trial voluntary, see Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 18-20 (1973);
United States v. Rogers, 853 F.2d 249, 251-52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 946 (1988); and United States v. Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 184 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088 (1976), and cert. denied, 424 U.S. 925
(1976).
15. Batson Challenges. In United States v. Malindez, 962 F.2d 332
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 215 (1992), the court held that the
defendant must still establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in
the use of peremptory challenges of potential jurors before the Government
is required to come forward with a nonracial justification for its challenges,
as required by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The issue arose in
the wake of Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), in which the Supreme
Court held that a defendant may object to race-based peremptory challenges
regardless of whether the defendant and the excluded juror(s) are of the
same race, and the Fourth Circuit's own decision in United States v. Joe,
928 F.2d 99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 71 (1991). The court in
Malindez declined to define precisely what might constitute a prima facie
case of discrimination, but it did cite with approval its own pre-Powers
decision in United States v. Grandison, 885 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 934 (1990) (defendant failed to establish prima facie case
where six of nine potential jurors struck by Government were black) and
further stated in a footnote: "The fact that 50 percent (four out of eight)
1993]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:119
of the Government's peremptory challenges were exercised against black
veniremen, standing alone, is insufficient to establishing a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination." Malindez, 962 F.2d at 332, n.2.
In United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
found no Batson violation in the Government's peremptory strike of the
sole black in the jury venire, accepting the Government's racially neutral
explanation that the juror had been a victim of crime and therefore might
be dissatisfied with the police.
Note that in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), the Supreme
Court held that a defendant is likewise prohibited from exercising peremp-
tory strikes in a discriminatory manner. How exactly this decision will play
out in practical application remains to be seen.
16. Co-Conspirator Statements. United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d
1252 (4th Cir. 1992), contains a lengthy discussion of the law of evidence
governing statements made by co-conspirators during, and in furtherance
of, a conspiracy per FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(E).
17. Harmless Error/Fact of Nontestifying Co-Defendant's Guilty Plea.
In United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held
that it was error to allow into evidence the fact that nontestifying co-
defendants had pled guilty, albeit harmless error in this particular case. The
Blevins opinion includes a lengthy discussion of the harmless error doctrine
generally, citing many cases.
18. Authenticating Tape Recordings. In United States v. Branch, 970
F.2d 1368 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth Circuit approved a pretrial in camera
hearing to consider authenticity of certain tape recordings to be later
introduced at trial. The court emphasized that this does not relieve the
Government of presenting sufficient authenticating evidence to the jury at
trial but simply streamlines the process and assures no prejudicial evidence
reaches the jury. In regard to laying a proper foundation for tape recordings
generally, see United States v. Long, 651 F.2d 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 896 (1981); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir.
1978); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 464 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Fuller, 441 F.2d 755, 762 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971).
19. Rule 403 (Probative Value Versus Prejudicial Effect). In United
States v. Analla, 975 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1992), the court, in a robbery and
murder trial, upheld the admission into evidence of two photographs of the
robbery victim's face showing gunshot wounds inflicted by the defendant,
and of one photograph of the murder victim lying in a pool of blood. The
court rejected the defendant's argument that the photographs, though
relevant, should be excluded because of their prejudicial effect under Rule
403. In United States v. Melton, 970 F.2d 1328 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
approved evidence of a related but unconvicted murder, against a Rule 403
challenge by the defendant.
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In regard to the standard of appellate review of a district court's Rule
403 analysis generally, see United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 301 n.2
(4th Cir. 1984) (probative/prejudicial determination of district court "will
not be overturned except under the most 'extraordinary' of circumstances,"
quoting United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 227-28 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1105 (1985); and
United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1983) (admission of
otherwise relevant evidence will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear
abuse of discretion).
For further discussion of Rule 403, see infra paragraph II.D.27.
20. Rule 404(b) Evidence. In United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098
(4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3479 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1993), the
court upheld in a prosecution for murder of the defendant's wife admission
of evidence of the defendant's extramarital affairs and generally abusive
treatment of the deceased. See also Virgin Islands v. Harris, 938 F.2d 401,
420 (3d Cir. 1991) (in murder case, evidence of defendant's "history of
violence" toward his "wife was "highly probative in demonstrating his motive
and intent as well as establishing that his wife's death was not accidental
or suicidal"); United States v. Stapleton, 730 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (W.D.
Va. 1990) ("It is generally recognized that an adulterous relationship,
particularly when it is clandestine, is evidence of possible strong motives
for murdering the cuckolded husband").
In United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
found it an abuse of discretion to admit certain Rule 404(b) evidence, but
found further in this case that the error was harmless. The court had this
to say about the harmless error doctrine in regard to Rule 404(b) evidence:
"[A]ny error in admission or exclusion is subject to the harmless error test:
'whether it is probable that the error could have affected the verdict reached
by the particular jury in the particular circumstances of the trial.' United
States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1078 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
908 (1988) (quoting United States v. Davis, 657 F.2d 637, 640 (4th Cir.
1981))." Kenny, 973 F.2d at 344.
In United States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
reversed the defendant's conviction for conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine, finding the district court abused
its discretion in admitting the defendant's statements to a local drug dealer
about her "recipe" for cooking crack cocaine, and about selling crack in
New York about six months before the charged crimifial conduct.
In United States v. Sanders, 964 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
found in a prosecution for assault and possession of a contraband weapon
in federal prison, admission of the defendant's prior convictions for assault
and possession of a contraband weapon to be reversible error as to the
resulting assault conviction, but harmless as to the contraband weapon
conviction. Judge Niemeyer dissented, stating that he had "little difficulty
in concluding that in this case intent was made an issue and that therefore
evidence of a prior assault, which is probative of intent, is admissible under
Rule 404(b)." Sanders, 964 F.2d at 300 (citations omitted).
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For further discussion of Rule 404(b), see infra paragraph II.D.28.
21. Structuring Monetary Transactions. In United States v. Rogers,
962 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held that proof of a willful violation
of 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (structuring monetary transactions to avoid reporting
requirements) does not require proof that a defendant knew structuring was
illegal. "We conclude that a criminal conviction for willfully violating [the
structuring law] may be sustained as long as the prosecution proves that
the defendant had knowledge of the currency reporting requirements and
acted to avoid them. No other specific intent need be shown. The defendant,
therefore, was not entitled to any jury instruction regarding knowledge of
illegality." Rogers, 962 F.2d at 345.
22. Money Laundering. In United States v. Peay, 972 F.2d 71 (4th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3979 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1993), the court
held the "effect on interstate commerce" element of money laundering (in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956) was sufficiently established by proof of
deposit of laundered funds in a bank insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). "We therefore hold that, in enacting § 1956,
Congress intended to exercise the full legislative power conferred by the
Commerce Clause. Only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce must
be shown for the application of such a statute to pass constitutional muster."
Peary, 972 F.2d at 74 (citing United States v. Spagnola, 546 F.2d 1117,
1119 (4th Cir. 1976)).
In United States v. Gilliam, 975 F.2d 1050, 1056 (4th Cir. 1992), the
court rejected the defendant's argument that 18 U.S.C. § 1956 is unconsti-
tutionally vague. The court applied the two part "void for vagueness" test
established in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983), in upholding
the money laundering statute against the defendant's constitutional chal-
lenge.
In United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992), the Fourth
Circuit reversed the district court's judgment of acquittal, approving a
money laundering conviction on a "willful blindness" theory. The court's
opinion in Campbell is a virtual primer on the "knowledge" and "con-
cealment" elements which must be proven in money laundering prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957.
23. Hobbs Act (Bribery of Public Official). In United States v. Taylor,
966 F.2d 830 (4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed the defendant's conviction
for certain violations of the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951), which proscribes
payments to public officials in exchange for votes or other public actions.
The defendant, a member of the South Carolina House of Representatives
snared in an undercover FBI "sting" known as "Operation Lost Trust,"
persuaded the Fourth Circuit that the jury instructions failed to distinguish
adequately between an illegal bribe and a campaign contribution followed
by a vote in accordance with the expressed wishes of the donor. See also
McCormick v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1807 (1991) (distinguishing Hobbs
Act violations from mere campaign contributions); Zant v. Stephens, 462
FOR THE CRIMINAL PRACTITIONER
U.S. 862, 881 (1983) (jury instructions which allow for conviction on two
or more independent grounds, any one of which is insufficient, constitutes
reversible error). The Taylor opinion also addresses the degree of proof
necessary to satisfy the "interstate commerce" element in a Hobbs Act
prosecution, in this instance rejecting the defendant's claims of insufficiency.
Taylor, 966 F.2d at 835-36.
24. Possession of False Identification Documents. In United States v.
Rohn, 964 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed a conviction for the
possession, with intent to use unlawfully, five or more false identification
documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(3). The Fourth Circuit found
the district court's jury instructions inadequate in that they failed to describe
the Government's burden to prove the unlawful nature of the use to which
the defendant intended to put the fraudulent documents.
25. Witness Tampering. In United States v. Kenny, 973 F.2d 339 (4th
Cir. 1992), the court approved prosecution for witness tampering under the
general obstruction of justice statute (18 U.S.C. § 1503), which carries
substantially higher penalties than the witness tampering statute (18 U.S.C.
§ 1512). The defendant in Kenny unsuccessfully argued that prosecution
was restricted to the more narrowly tailored statute (18 U.S.C. § 1512).
'The court made the general observation that "[tihe existence of a more
narrowly tailored statute does not necessarily prevent prosecution under a
broader statute, so long as the defendant is not punished under both statutes
for the same conduct," citing United States v. Grenagle, 588 F.2d 87 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 927 (1978). On prosecution of witness tampering
under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 specifically, see also United States v. Williams, 874
F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1989). Accord United States v. Kulczyk, 931 F.2d 542
(9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Branch, 850 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Marrapese, 826 F.2d 145 (lst Cir. 1987).
26. Attempts to Commit a Crime. In United States v. Sutton, 961
F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 171 (1992), the court held that
producing cash to be used to purchase marijuana (here, $28,000), and an
agreement to close the deal later the same day, was sufficient to sustain
defendant's conviction for attempt to possess marijuana with intent to
distribute. As the court held in United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067,
1074 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988), to support a
conviction for attempt, "the evidence must show (a) culpable intent, and
(b) a substantial step toward the commission of the crime that is strongly
corroborative of that intent." '[A] substantial step' is "'more than mere
preparation, yet may be less than the last act necessary before the actual
commission of the substantive crime."' United States v. Delvecchio, 816
F.2d 859, 861 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Martinez, 775 F.2d
31, 35 (2d Cir. 1985)).
27. Lesser Included Offenses. In United States v. Walkingeagle, 974
F.2d 551 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held that uncharged lesser included
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offenses could be sent to the jury, even after the district court granted the
defendant's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on the 18 U.S.C. §
1153 violations (offenses committed within Indian Country) charged in the
indictment. Judge Hamilton wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion.
28. Entrapment/Outrageous Government Conduct. In United States v.
Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held if the issue of
entrapment is submitted to the jury, "an appellate court may overturn [the
jury's rejection of the entrapment defense] only if no rational trier of fact
could have found predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution," citing United
States v. Akinseye, 802 F.2d 740, 744 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482
U.S. 916 (1987). The defendant in Jones contended that undercover gov-
ernment agents had induced him to sell them machine guns and other
firearms for large amounts of money, leaving him with the impression that
the guns were for the Contras in Nicaragua. In regard to the Government's
burden in overcoming an entrapment defense, see Jacobsen v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540-41 (1992), and United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d
32, 37-38 (4th Cir. 1991).
The Jones court also rejected the defendant's claim that the undercover
operation constituted "outrageous" government conduct in violation of due
process of law, citing United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, 1087 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1018 (1985) (undercover agents posing as
criminals who persisted in persuading state judge to "help" them despite
his initial hesitation not "outrageous" government conduct), United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (contemplating possibility of "out-
rageous" government conduct in violation of due process guarantees, but
not finding it on facts of case at bar). In rejecting the defendant's due
process claim in Jones, the court noted again its rejection (in Osborne, 935
F.2d at 35-36) of "the proposition that the government may not conduct
an undercover investigation without reasonable cause to suspect criminal
wrongdoing." Jones, 976 F.2d at 182; see also United States v. Steinhorn,
739 F. Supp. 268, 272 (D. Md. 1990).
29. Reopening Case After Close of Evidence. In United States v. Peay,
972 F.2d 71, 73-74 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3479 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1993), the court reversed the district court for abusing its discretion
in allowing the government to reopen its case after the close of evidence-
then refusing to allow the defendant to call a witness to impeach the
Government's belated witness. On reopening a case after the close of
evidence generally, see United States v. Paz, 927 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir.
1991); United States v. Thetford, 676 F.2d 170, 182 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1148 (1983); United States v. Carter, 569 F.2d 801, 803
(4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 973 (1978).
30. Rule 29/Sufficiency of the Evidence. In United States v. Sutton,
961 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 171 (1992), the court
affirmed denial of the defendant's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
FOR THE CRIMINAL PRACTITIONER
The Rule 29 standard is a familiar one: "whether, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of facts could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States
v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). For
further discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence standard, see infra
paragraph II.D.36.
In United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
61 U.S.L.W. 3583 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1993), the court reversed the district
court's granting of the defendant's post-verdict Rule 29 motion. However,
because the error in Campbell was substantially a misstatement of the
Government's burden of proof (in money laundering prosecution), the court
stated the standard of review on appeal thus: "[b]ecause the question is a
matter of law, we review the issue de novo and need accord no deference
to the district court's determination that the evidence is insufficient." Id.
at 856.
In United States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
found sufficient evidence to support a murder conviction although no body
was ever found. The opinion includes a lengthy discussion of state and
federal authority on this point. Id. at 1110-11.
31. Jury Instructions. In United States v. Craigo, 956 F.2d 65, 67-68
(4th Cir. 1992), the court held that technically inaccurate jury instructions
will result in reversal only if there is a "reasonable likelihood" the jury
misconstrued the instruction and the erroneous instruction "prejudice[d] the
jury's consideration of the dispositive issue." The court cited Boyde v.
California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990) and United States v. Davis, 739 F.2d 172,
175 (4th Cir. 1984).
In United States v. Hanley, 974 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1992), the court did
not find reversible error in the court's apparently inadvertent error in
instructing the jury: "On the other hand, if a reasonable doubt exists in
your mind concerning the guilt of the defendant as to one or more of the
counts, then it will be your duty to find the defendant guilty as to such
count or counts" (emphasis added). The court cited United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1985) in finding that the court's inadvertent misstate-
ment "did not have an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations,
or in any way undermine the fairness of the trial or contribute to a
miscarriage of justice." Manley, 974 F.2d at 18.
Two 1992 opinions discussed and approved giving the jury Allen charges:
United States v. Seeright, 978 F.2d 842, 850 (4th Cir. 1992) and United
States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1992). "The Allen charge, which
takes its name from the Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. United States,
164 U.S. 492 (1896), essentially informs a deadlocked jury that a new trial
would be expensive for both sides; that there is no reason to believe that
another jury would do a better job; that it is important that a unanimous
verdict be reached; and that jurors who are in the minority should consider,
without surrendering their convictions, whether the majority's position might
be correct." Russell, 971 F.2d at 1107 n.18. On the Allen charge generally,
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see United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 869 (1989), 493 U.S. 959 (1989), and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070
(1990); United States v. Martin, 756 F.2d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc);
and United States v. Sawyers, 423 F.2d 1335, 1341-43 (4th Cir. 1970) ("the
leading Allen charge case in the Fourth Circuit," according to Russell, 971
F.2d at 1107 n.18).
For further discussion of jury instructions, see infra paragraphs II.D.4.6
(Joinder and Severance of Defendants/Jury Instructions); II.D.17 (Voir
Dire/Right to Impartial Jury); and II.D.39 (Jury Instructions).
32. Inconsistent Verdicts. In United States v. Harriott, 976 F.2d 198
(4th Cir. 1992), the court held again that an "inconsistent jury verdict" is
ordinarily not a valid basis for acquittal, particularly where "the reason for
the jury's not guilty verdict may have been lenity." Id. at 202. For further
discussion of inconsistent verdicts, see infra paragraph II.D.40.
33. Rule 33 (Motion for New Trial). In United States v. Campbell,
977 F.2d 854 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 144 (1992), the court
affirmed the lower court's conditional granting of defendant's Rule 33
motion for a new trial "should the entry of a judgment of acquittal be
granted on appeal." Id. at 860. The court emphasized the district court's
broader discretion in considering a Rule 33 motion, including an ability to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, "to draw inferences, unfavorable to
the Government, from the evidence." Id. at 860.
For further discussion of Rule 33, see infra paragraph II.D.49.
34. Lengthy Sentences. In United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 144 (1992), the court affirmed a 40-year
sentence for mail fraud and false statement violations. The court rejected
each of the defendant's objections to the sentence, to wit: (a) that it was
an "illegal sentence" correctable under Rule 35(a); (b) that the enhancement
of a pre-Sentencing Guidelines sentence for perjury should be disallowed,
as the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178,
183-85 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2272 (1992), in regard to
Sentencing Guidelines sentences; and (c) that the long sentence is so dispro-
portionate to the offense as to constitute "cruel and unusual punishment"
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. On the last point, see also United
States v. A'nalla, 975 F.2d 119, 127 (4th Cir. 1992) (no Fifth Amendment
equal protection violation in life sentence for murder in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1111 due to lesser 20-year mandatory minimum for murder in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)); United States v. Guglielmi, 929 F.2d 1001,
1002, 1004 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Polk, 905 F.2d 54, 55 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 519 (1990); United States v. Thomas, 900
F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir. 1990); and United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019,
1028 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986).
For further discussion of length of sentences, see infra paragraph
II.D.18.
35. Sentencing: Alien Status as Factor. In United States v. Salama,
974 F.2d 520 (4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld a finding that the defendant
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was an "organizer or leader" of criminal activity based in part on the
defendant's alien status. The court conceded that it considered the remarks
about the defendant's alien status "inappropriate," but found it to be
harmless error in that the subject enhancement was otherwise supported by
the facts properly before the court. Id. at 522.
Likewise, in United States v. Munoz, 974 F.2d 493, 495-96 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3435 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1992), the court found no
"fatal impropriety" in the judge's comment on the defendant's alien status
at sentencing: "It really is revolting to me to see you people come up here
from South America, take advantage of our system, take advantage of the
wealth, the work and good people of this country and bring in these drugs
by the ton. You care nothing about this country." In affirming the convic-
tion, the court explained that "the court may appropriately take judicial
notice of the fact that South America, in general, and Colombia, in
particular, are major sources of the cocaine sold and used in the United
States," but that in any event "the connection between the group targeted
for deterrence and the defendant must be the criminal conduct and not the
defendant's national origin." Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added).
36. Notice of Appeal. In regard to time limitations for giving notice
of appeal generally, see FED. R. App. P. 4(b); United States v. Raynor,
939 F.2d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351,
353 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 857 (1985); United States v. Breit,
754 F.2d 526 (4th Cir. 1985); and United States v. Schuchardt, 685 F.2d
901, 902 (4th Cir. 1982).
37. Waiver of Appeal. In United States v. Matin, 961 F.2d 493 (4th
Cir. 1992) and United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 185-86 (4th Cir. 1992),
the Fourth Circuit upheld again the knowing and voluntary waiver of a
defendant's right to appeal. See also United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d
165 (4th Cir.1991); United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Guevara, 941 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied, 949 F.2d
706 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 160 (1992) (defendant's knowing
waiver of appeal held, as matter of basic fairness, to also preclude Govern-
ment from appealing).
38. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Conflict of Interest. Several 1992
cases were remanded for further proceedings to determine whether an
attorney's alleged conflict of interest constituted a violation of the defen-
dant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. For further discussion of a conflict
of interest as ineffective assistance of counsel, see infra paragraph II.D.52.c.
In United States v. Gilliam, 975 F.2d 1050 (4th Cir. 1992), the court
remanded for a Rule 44(c) hearing to determine whether joint representation
of father-son defendants denied the son (to whom a more favorable plea
agreement was offered) effective representation of counsel.
In United States v. Swartz, 975 F.2d 1042, 1050 (4th Cir. 1992), the
court vacated the defendant's sentencing and remanded for resentencing on
the basis of a conflict (also due to joint representation), which first developed
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during sentencing proceedings. Similarly, in United States v. Magini, 973
F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1992), the court reversed a grant of summary judgment
for the government in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) proceeding and remanded
for an evidentiary hearing on petitioner's claim that her attorney's preoc-
cupation with selling certain of her assets to pay his legal fees impinged on
her constitutional right to effective representation in the trial court. Magini,
973 F.2d at 264-65.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Petitions.
a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims. In United States v.
Hanley, 974 F.2d 14, 16 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992), and United States v.
Underwood, 970 F.2d 1336, 1340 (4th Cir. 1992), the court held
again that ineffective assistance of counsel claims should ordinarily
be raised in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) proceedings, not on direct
appeal. For further discussion of this point, see infra paragraph
II.D. 52.a.
In Fields v. Attorney General of the State of Maryland, 956 F.2d 1290
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 243 (1992), the court reiterated the
familiar principles and standards which are to be applied when an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is asserted after an otherwise valid guilty plea.
The court began by pointing out the array of rights and even prior
constitutional violations waived by a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty,
citing numerous cases. Id. at 1294-95.
Next, the court in Fields laid out the familiar principles and standards
to be applied in evaluating a post guilty plea claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel per the Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53-59 (1985), and Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) lines of authority, to wit:
(1) "First, 'the defendant must show that counsel's representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' 466 U.S. at
687-88. Second, '[t]he defendant must show that there is a reason-
able probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.' Id. at 694. These two components are typically
referred to as the 'performance' and 'prejudice' components. Id. at
698." Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297.
(2) "The defendant bears the burden of proving Strickland preju-
dice. See Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1430-31 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1065 (1984). If the defendant cannot
demonstrate the requisite prejudice, a reviewing court need not
consider the performance prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697."
Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297.
(3) "In Hooper v. Garraghty, 845 F.2d 471 (4th Cir. 1988), we
stated:
When a defendant challenges a conviction entered after a
guilty plea, [the] "prejudice" prong of the [Strickland] test
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is slightly modified. Such a defendant "must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial.
845 F.2d at 475 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59)." Fields, 956 F.2d
at 1297 (emphasis added).
(4) Statements previously made by a defendant under oath affirming
satisfaction with counsel will be binding on a defendant who later
asserts ineffective assistance unless there is "clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary." Fields, 956 F.2d at 1299 (citing Blackledge
v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74-75 (1977)).
(5) The fact that a plea bargain is "favorable" to a defendant and
that accepting it was "a reasonable and prudent decision" is itself
evidence of "[t]he voluntary and intelligent" nature of the plea.
Fields, 956 F.2d at 1299.
b. Right to Evidentiary Hearing. "Section 2255 provides for an
evidentiary hearing '[u]nless the motion and the files and the records
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief....' 28 U.S.C. § 2255." United States v. Magini, 973 F.2d
261, 264 (4th Cir. 1992). The court in Magini reversed the granting
of summary judgment against a petitioner alleging that her attorney
had a conflict of interest, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing
on disputed facts. For further discussion of this point, see infra
paragraph II.D.53.b.
c. Second and Subsequent § 2255 Proceedings: Abuse of the Writ
Doctrine. In United States v. MacDonald, 966 F.2d 854 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 606 (1992), the court applied the "abuse
of the writ" doctrine to a second habeas petition filed by Captain
Jeffrey MacDonald challenging his 1979 conviction for the murders
of his wife and two daughters. MacDonald's allegations of newly
discovered evidence-lab notes describing synthetic hairs and wool
fibers allegedly supporting MacDonald's defense-were held insuf-
ficient to meet "the stringent requirements of McCleskey v. Zant,
111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), necessary to overcome dismissal of a second
or subsequent collateral claim for abuse of the writ." MacDonald,
966 F.2d at 856. For further discussion of the abuse of the writ
doctrine, see infra paragraph II.D.53.c..
d. No Right to Counsel. In United States v. MacDonald, 966 F.2d
854 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 606 (1992), the court held
(a) that there is no right to an attorney in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1988) proceeding, citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555
(1987), and (b) therefore, an attorney error made in a prior Section
2255 proceeding "cannot serve as cause to review subsequent peti-
tions." MacDonald, 966 F.2d at 859 n.9.
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e. Cross References. For further discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1988) proceedings, see infra paragraphs II.D.52 (Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel), and II.D.53 (Other 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Proceed-
ings).
II. SELECTED PRINCIPLES CITED IN UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
As stated in every unpublished Fourth Circuit slip opinion, which
includes the overwhelming majority of opinions rendered, "Unpublished
opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See I.O.P. 36.5 and
36.6."
However, many principles of law are cited in unpublished opinions,
citing prior published opinions which collectively indicate what precedents
the Fourth Circuit considers significant on a whole array of issues.
The following are selected propositions and principles of law cited in
the court's unpublished opinions in calendar year 1992, chosen with an eye
toward practical usefulness.
A. DRUG CASES
1. Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE). To sustain a conviction for
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, the government must prove
five elements: "(1) defendant committed a felony violation of the federal
drug laws; (2) such violation was part of a continuing series of violations
of the drug laws; (3) the series of violations were undertaken by defendant
in concert with five or more persons; (4) defendant served as an organizer
or supervisor, or in another management capacity with respect to these
other persons; and (5) defendant derived substantial income or resources
from the continuing series of violations." United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d
885, 890-91 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1047 (1990).
In proving the "organizer or supervisor" element, the government is
not required to prove that the five individuals were supervised at the same
time, nor must the five individuals be under the direct or immediate control
of the defendant. The defendant need only occupy a position of manage-
ment. Id. at 891. "Thus, a defendant may not insulate himself from ...
liability by carefully pyramiding authority so as to maintain fewer than five
direct subordinates." Id. A mere buyer-seller relationship, however, is not
sufficient to prove a violation under section 848. United States v. Butler,
885 F.2d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 1989).
Although the statute does not prescribe the minimum amount of money
required to constitute substantial income, this element is met where "tens
of thousands" of dollars from a drug business move in and out of a
defendant's possession. See United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174, 182
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981), and opinion modified in part,
669 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 935 (1982).
Finally, where a defendant is convicted of engaging in a continuing
criminal enterprise and of a lesser included drug conspiracy, the conspiracy
conviction should be set aside and sentencing should only be on the CCE
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conviction. United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 292 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 859, and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989), and cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1070 (1990); United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 978 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934, and cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934, and reh'g
denied, 485 U.S. 1042 (1988).
For further discussion of CCE prosecutions, see supra paragraph I.A.1.
2. Drug Conspiracies. In order to establish a drug conspiracy in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988), the government must prove: (1) an
agreement between two or more persons to engage in conduct that violates
a federal drug law, and (2) "the defendant's wilful joinder in that agreement.
United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 639, 641-42 (4th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1105 (1985); United States v. Watkins, 662 F.2d 1090, 1097 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). A conspiracy need not be proven
by direct evidence; rather, conspiracies are often proven circumstantially,
based upon the relationship between the alleged conspirators and the nature
of their conduct. United States v. Brown, 856 F.2d 710, 711-12 (4th Cir.
1988).
Nor must a particular co-conspirator be shown to have complete knowl-
edge of the conspiracy; knowledge of its "essential object" is sufficient.
United States v. Goldman, 750 F.2d 1221, 1227 (4th Cir. 1984); see also
United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 130 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1951 (1992); Brown, 856 F.2d at 711; United States v. Leavis,
853 F.2d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1988); Collazo, 732 F.2d at 1205.
The Fourth Circuit has on numerous occasions approved evidence of
firearms in drug conspiracy cases, whether or not there are separate firearms
counts charged. See, e.g., United States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 892 (4th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1047 (1990); Collazo, 732 F.2d at 1206.
Accord United States v. Blackman, 897 F.2d 309, 317 (8th Cir.), aff'd on
reh'g, 904 F.2d 1250 (1990); United States v. Green, 887 F.2d 25, 27 (1st
Cir. 1989); United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
For further discussion of drug conspiracies, see supra paragraph I.A.2.
3. Quantity of Drugs. Perhaps the most frequently raised issue on
appeal in drug cases is the quantity of drugs for which a particular defendant
should be held accountable for sentencing purposes. The pertinent factors
and principles:
a. Preponderance Standard/General Considerations. The quantity
of drugs used to compute the base offense level must only be proven
by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1148 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3051 (1992); United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d
444, 450 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Engleman, 916 F.2d 182,
184 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1444
(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81, 85 (4th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084 (1990); United States v. Vinson,
886 F.2d 740, 741-42 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062
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(1990). This quantity includes up to the total amount of drugs
distributed in a conspiracy, if the defendant could reasonably foresee
the distribution of future amounts. United States v. Willard, 909
F.2d 780, 781 (4th Cir. 1990), or "knew or reasonably should have
known what the past quantities were." United States v. Miranda-
Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172,- 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 347
(1991). See also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4, Application Note 1 ("[D]rug
conspirators should be punished in a manner commensurate with
the scale of the conspiracy, rather than their personal participation
in the conspiracy"); United States v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 39, 46
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 348 (1991).
b. Clearly Erroneous Standard on Appeal. The district court's
findings as to the quantity of drugs for sentencing purposes will be
affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Brooks, 957 F.2d at
1148; Campbell, 935 F.2d at 46; Goff, 907 F.2d at 1444; United
States v. Wilson, 896 F.2d 856, 858 (4th Cir. 1990); Vinson, 886
F.2d at 742; Mark, 943 F.2d at 450; United States v. Williams, 880
F.2d 804, 806 (4th Cir. 1989).
c. Types and Quantities of Drugs Not in Count(s) of Conviction.
Types and quantities of drugs not specified in the count(s) of
conviction are to be considered in determining the offense level if
they were part of the same course of conduct or part of a common
scheme or plan. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1); United States v. Cusack,
901 F.2d 29, 32-33 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Williams, 880
F.2d at 805-06.
d. Court May Estimate Quantity. When the quantity of drugs is
uncertain, the court must "approximate the quantity." U.S.S.G. §
2D1.4, Application Note 2 (providing, for example, that court may
consider street prices, financial or other records, similar transactions
by defendant, and other specified factors); United States v. Johnson,
943 F.2d 383, 387-88 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 667 (1991).
e. Quantity of Drugs for Which Defendant was Acquitted. Because
of the difference in standard of proof (preponderance versus rea-
sonable doubt), acquitted conduct may be considered for purposes
of sentencing, if supported by the appropriate findings. United
States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713, 716-17 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1690 (1992); United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d
243, 246 (4th Cir. 1991); Powell, 886 F.2d at 85; United States v.
Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1989).
f. Hearsay. The amount of drugs for sentencing purposes is a
factual question which the district court may resolve by considering
any relevant and reliable evidence before it, including hearsay.
United States v. Bowman, 926 F.2d 380, 381 (4th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Wilson, 896 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1990); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a).
g. Court Not Bound by Stipulations in Plea Agreements. In de-
termining the quantity of drugs for sentencing purposes, the district
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court is not bound by stipulations in plea agreements. U.S.S.G. §
6B1.4, Policy Statement; see also United States v. Easterling, 921
F.2d 1073, 1079 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2066 (1990).
h. Findings in Presentence Reports. Where the quantity of drugs
noted in the Presentence Report is challenged, the defendant has
an affirmative duty to show that the information is inaccurate or
unreliable. United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990).
i. Drug Equivalent of Cash Seized. In determining the quantity of
drugs, the district court may consider "the drug equivalent of the
cash seized," if it concludes that the cash came from the sale of
drugs. United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 882 (4th Cir. 1991).
4. Possession. Possession of drugs may be sole or joint, actual or
constructive. Constructive possession exists when the person "exercises, or
has the power to exercise, dominion and control" over the drugs. United
States v. Zandi, 769 F.2d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1077 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925
(1980). For a recent case discussing and finding constructive possession of
a gun, see United States v. Jones, 945 F.2d 747, 749-50 (4th Cir. 1991).
5. Intent to Distribute. The intent to distribute drugs may be inferred
from a number of factors, including but not limited to the quantity, the
packaging, how and where the drugs are hidden, and the amount of cash
seized. United States v. Bell, 954 F.2d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Fisher, 912 F.2d 728, 730 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2019 (1991); United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Grubbs, 773 F.2d 599, 603-04 (4th Cir. 1985); United States
v. Wooten, 688 F.2d 941, 946 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Welebir,
498 F.2d 346, 350-51 (4th Cir. 1974).
6. Proof of Cocaine. Expert testimony is not necessary to establish
the identity of the substance involved in an alleged narcotics transaction as
long as there is sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 334 (6th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976).
7. Use of Firearm During and in Relation to Drug Trafficking. The
"use" of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988) is committed even if the firearm is
only constructively possessed "for protection and to facilitate the likelihood
of success," whether or not it is ever actually held, brandished, or otherwise
used. United States v. Brockington, 849 F.2d 872, 876 (4th Cir. 1988); see
also United States v. Paz, 927 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 1991). Other issues
raised in section 924(c) prosecutions:
a. Multiple Firearms. Multiple firearms involved in a single offense
will not support multiple 924(c) convictions. United States v. Casey,
776 F. Supp. 272, 276 (E.D. Va. 1991) (collecting cases).
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b. Enhanced (20-Year) Sentence for Second or Subsequent Con-
viction: The 20-year enhancement provisions of § 924(c)(1) apply
even if the second firearm offense is charged in the same indictment
as the first. United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 193-94 (4th
Cir. 1991) (joining majority of circuits in expressly rejecting argu-
ment that enhancement only applies to conviction for offense com-
mitted after first § 924(c) conviction).
c. Gun/Expert Testimony Unnecessary. Neither the firearm itself
nor expert testimony about the firearm is necessary to sustain a
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Rather, lay testimony regarding
the use of what they believed to be a firearm is sufficient. United
States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 683 (1991).
8. Firearm Enhancement/Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)
provides for a two-level enhancement "[i]f a dangerous weapon was pos-
sessed during commission of the offense [unless] it is clearly improbable
that the weapon was connected with the offense." The district court's
determination is by a preponderance of the evidence and will be affirmed
unless found to be clearly erroneous. United States v. Apple, 915 F.2d 899,
914 (4th Cir. 1990). Moreover, even if a defendant is acquitted of a related
924(c) charge, the two level enhancement is properly applied if a weapon
was present during any of the subject drug trafficking. United States v.
Romulus, 949 F.2d 713, 716-17 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1690 (1992); United States v. Johnson, 943 F.2d 383, 386 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 667 (1991); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433
(4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747, 748-49 (5th
Cir. 1989). Likewise, the fact that the prosecutor decides not to charge an
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) violation does not prevent a U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(b)(1)
enhancement. United States v. Bowman, 926 F.2d 380, 381-82 (4th Cir.
1991). Possession or use of a firearm by a co-defendant has also been held
to be sufficient basis for the firearms enhancement. See United States v.
Johnson, 943 F.2d 383, 386 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 667 (1991).
9. Severe Penalties for Crack Cocaine. The more severe penalties
assigned to crack cocaine in the Sentencing Guidelines (one gram of crack
cocaine treated as 100 Grams of powder cocaine, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)) is
"rational" and otherwise constitutional. United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d
37, 39-40 (4th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751,
755 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 404 n.7 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 646 (1991); United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d
411, 418 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 979-80
(8th Cir. 1990).
10. Expert Testimony on Packaging/Distribution. Because the distri-
bution of drugs is outside the sphere of experience of many jurors, expert
testimony regarding the packaging, dosages, and other aspects of the drug
trade do not invade the jury's factfinding role, and therefore is permissible.
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United States v. Safari, 849 F.2d 891, 895 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
945 (1988); see also United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 451-52 (7th Cir.
1991).
B. SENTENCING GUIDELINES IssuEs
1. Straddle Conspiracies. A conspiracy which began prior to but
continued beyond the effective date of the Sentencing Guidelines (November
1, 1987), a so-called "straddle conspiracy," is fully subject to the Sentencing
Guidelines. United States v. Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428, 437 (4th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1474 (1992); United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d
728, 739 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Meitinger, 901 F.2d 27, 28 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 519 (1990); United States v. Sheffer, 896
F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 432 (1990).
2. Amount of Loss. The determination of the amount of loss is
essentially a factual question, requiring affirmance on appeal unless the
district court's conclusions are clearly erroneous. See United States v.
Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 1989). The Sentencing Guidelines
allow values to be "inferred from any reasonably reliable information
available" and do not require the loss to be determined with precision.
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.3. The Government meets its burden of proof if
the value can be so inferred by a preponderance of the evidence. United
States v. Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1989) (preponderance proper
standard of proof in resolving factual disputes regarding sentencing).
On occasions when the probable or intended loss is greater than the
actual loss, the greater amount is used to determine the defendant's sentence.
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, cmt. n.7. This is particularly apt to be true in the case
of an uncompleted conspiracy. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1; United States
v. Depew, 932 F.2d 324, 330 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 210 (1991)
(intended criminal conduct carries same weight as actual conduct); United
States v. Medeiros, 897 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1990) (fact that additional
acts were necessary to complete conspiracy did not render contemplated
outcome "speculative" within meaning of commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1).
For further discussion of amount of loss for Sentencing Guidelines
purposes, see supra paragraph I.B.l.
3. Perjury. U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3(b)(2) states, "If the perjury or subordi-
nation of perjury resulted in substantial interference with the administration
of justice, increase by three levels." There is a "substantial interference,"
for example, when the conduct results in "unnecessary expenditure of
substantial governmental.., resources." United States v. Dudley, 941 F.2d
260, 265 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 908 (1992) (citing U.S.S.G.
§ 2J1.3(b)(2), cmt. n.1).
4. Role in the Offense (Leader/Organizer/Manager/Supervisor). One
frequently appealed Sentencing Guidelines issue is whether a particular
defendant should receive an enhancement per section 3B1.1 for his or her
role in the offense (that is, as a leader, organizer, manager, or supervisor).
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Although role in the offense findings are appealable, because the determi-
nation is factual in nature and the district court will be overturned only if
"clearly erroneous," role in the offense issues are seldom successfully raised
on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Paz, 927 F.2d 176, 180 (4th Cir.
1991); United States v. Fells, 920 F.2d 1179, 1185 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2831 (1991) (upholding district court's enhancement for
unidentified participants); United States v. Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 846 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 432 (1990). For further discussion of role in
the offense enhancements, see supra paragraph I.B.2.
5. Abuse of Position of Trust. As in issues pertaining to role in the
offense the determination whether a defendant has abused a position of
trust per U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 are deemed to be factual in nature and will be
overturned on appeal only if "clearly erroneous." United States v. Helton,
953 F.2d 867, 870 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Chester, 919 F.2d 896,
900 (4th Cir. 1990).
This enhancement has been given for defendants holding a wide range
of positions: a United States Marshal, United States v. Pascucci, 943 F.2d
1032 (9th Cir. 1991); a prison case manager, United States v. Brown, 941
F.2d 1300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 648 (1991); a comptroller and
administrative manager of a company, United States v. Harotunian, 920
F.2d 1040 (1st Cir. 1990); an airline' junior station agent, United States v.
Castagnet, 936 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1991); a Customs Service informant, United
States v. Young, 932 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1991); a mail handler, United
States v. Lange, 918 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1990); a savings and loan branch
manager, United States v. McMillen, 917 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1990); a truck
driver, United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1990); a baby sitter,
United States v. Zamarripa, 905 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1990); a bank janitor,
United States v. Drabeck, 905 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1990), on rehearing,
redesignated as a memorandum opinion, 944 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991); a
police officer, United States v. Foreman, 905 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1990); a
security guard, United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 196 (1990); and a bank loan clerk, United States v. Ehrlich, 902
F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 788 (1991).
Under the test set out in United States v. Hill, 915 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.
1990), and used by the Second Circuit in United States v. Castagnet, 936
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1991), a position of trust is one which gives the defendant
the freedom to commit a difficult-to-detect wrong, with two indicia: (1) the
criminal act will not be discovered as a matter of routine (such as the daily
audit of a bank teller's till), and (2) the defendant's activities are not readily
observed, so that he is in a position to commit a crime and leave the area
before the crime is discovered. Hill, 915 F.2d at 506. Whether the defendant
was in a position of trust must be viewed from the perspective of the victim.
Castagnet, 936 F.2d at 62; Hill, 925 F.2d at 506 n.3.
For further discussion of the abuse of a position of trust enhancement,
see supra paragraph I.B.3.
6. Obstruction of Justice. Another Sentencing Guidelines issue com-
manding much appellate ink is whether particular conduct warrants an
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"obstruction of justice" enhancement per U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The following
are examples of conduct the courts have held to justify this enhancement:
(a) providing false information to the Magistrate at a bond hearing, United
States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713, 717 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1690 (1992); (b) use of an alias at the time of arrest or interview by
law enforcement, United States v. Saintil, 910 F.2d 1231, 1232-33 (4th Cir.
1990); United States v. Rogers, 917 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1318 (1991); United States v. Irabor, 894 F.2d 554, 556 (2d Cir.
1990); United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1372-75 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 322 (1989); (c) providing misleading or false information or even
refusing to testify about a co-defendant's involvement in the offense, United
States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 737, 739 (11th Cir. 1991) (refusal to testify at
co-defendant's trial held obstruction of justice); United States v. Dyer, 910
F.2d 530, 533 (8th Cir. 1990) (defendant who admitted her own criminal
conduct but denied co-defendant's involvement obstructed justice); (d)
throwing evidence (drugs) out of a car during a police chase, United States
v. Galvan-Garcia, 872 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 857
(1989); (e) hiding a stolen credit card in a police car, United States v.
Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861 (1989);
and (f) hiding stolen mail under a car when being approached by authorities,
United States v. Cain, 881 F.2d 980, 982 (11th Cir. 1989).
However, per the sharply divided en banc decision in United States v.
Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 182-85 (4th Cir.), modified, 950 F.2d 149 (4th
Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2272 (1992), it remains for the time
being the law of the Fourth Circuit that testifying falsely in one's own
defense, that is, committing perjury, is not a proper basis for an obstruction
of justice enhancement.
For further discussion of obstruction of justice, see supra paragraph
I.B.4.
7. Acceptance of Responsibility. To receive a two-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility per U.S.S.G. § 3El.1 a defendant must accept
responsibility for all his criminal activity. United States v. Gordon, 895
F.2d 932, 936 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990). The district
court's determination whether a defendant has accepted responsibility is
deemed factual in nature and therefore will be affirmed on appeal unless
clearly erroneous. United States v. Greenwood, 928 F.2d 645, 646 (4th Cir.
1991); United States v. Cusack, 901 F.2d 29, 31 (4th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Harris, 882 F.2d 902, 905 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. White,
875 F.2d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 1989). Several related points:
a. Defendant Has Burden. The defendant has the burden of show-
ing he is entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Harris, 882 F.2d at 907.
b. Timeliness of Acceptance/Acceptance After Trial. Timeliness of
a defendant's acceptance of responsibility is pertinent in determining
whether a reduction is appropriate. United States v. Martinez, 901
F.2d 374, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1990). Therefore, when a defendant
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chooses to go to trial, the reduction is warranted only "in rare
situations." U.S.S.G. § 3El.1, cmt. n.2.
c. Continued Criminal Conduct. A defendant's continued criminal
conduct after arrest will usually make reduction for acceptance of
responsibility inappropriate. See, e.g., United States v. O'Neil, 936
F.2d 599, 600-01 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Lassiter, 929 F.2d
267, 270 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204,
1215-16 (11th Cir. 1989).
For further discussion of acceptance of responsibility, see supra para-
graph I.B.5.
8. Criminal History/Career Offender. Convictions for offenses com-
mitted after the subject offense are counted in a defendant's criminal history.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2; United States v. Hoy, 932 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir.
1991); United States v. Walker, 912 F.2d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1004 (1991); United States v. Altman, 901 F.2d 1161,
1165-66 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 900 F.2d 1442, 1446-47
(10th Cir. 1990). However, to count toward career offender status, the
instant offense must have been committed after conviction for the two prior
predicate offenses. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(3); United States v. Bassil, 932 F.2d
342, 346 (4th Cir. 1991). For further discussion of criminal history and
career offender status see supra paragraphs I.B.6 (Career Offenders), I.B.7.c
(Downward Departures/Criminal History Category Overstates Seriousness
of Criminal History), and I.B.8 (Upward Departures), and infra paragraph
II.B.10 (Upward Departures).
a. Related Cases as Single Conviction. Determination whether
convictions for two or more crimes are so related that they should
be counted as a single conviction-a momentous determination when
career offender status hangs in the balance-are reviewed de novo,
assuming there are no disputed facts. United States v. Rivers, 929
F.2d 136 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 431 (1991). However,
the mere fact of separate convictions makes it difficult to prove
otherwise: shared motivation for the crimes is not enough, United
States v. Sanders, 954 F.2d 227, 231-32 (4th Cir. 1992); nor is a
similar modus operandi, United States v. Davis, 922 F.2d 1385,
1389-90 (9th Cir. 1991); nor is the fact that concurrent sentences
were imposed for otherwise separate crimes, United States v. Hines,
943 F.2d 348, 355 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 613 (1991).
b. Court's Discretion to Downward Depart. The court does have
authority to depart downward if career offender status overstates
the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history. United States v.
Pinckney, 938 F.2d 519, 520-22 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1991). However, such
departures are only envisioned in the "atypical" or "truly unusual"
case. Adkins, 937 F.2d at 952.
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c. Burglary as Violent Crime. For career offender purposes, con-
viction for unlawful entry into a dwelling is considered to be the
"violent crime" of "burglary" described in section 4Bl.1, whether
the state crime is referred to as burglary, housebreaking, breaking
and entering, or by some other label. United States v. Wilson, 951
F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2294 (1992);
United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 195-96 (4th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Cruz, 882 F.2d 922, 923 (5th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Davis, 881 F.2d 973, 976 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1026 (1990); United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 144
(7th Cir. 1989). Closely related is whether a conviction for unlawful
entry of a dwelling constitutes "burglary" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),
15-year mandatory minimum, per the Armed Career Criminal Act,
for possession of a firearm after three convictions for serious drug
offenses and/or crimes of violence. As the Supreme Court held in
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the label does not
matter; only if the subject statute prohibits something in addition
to unlawful entry of a dwelling is there further inquiry into the
particular facts, and then only to determine whether it was, in fact,
unlawful entry of a dwelling which was charged and convicted.
9. Downward Departures.
a. Refusal Ordinarily Not Appealable. Unless the district court
wrongly believes it lacks authority to depart, the district court's
decision not to depart downward is not appealable. United States
v. Meitinger, 901 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
519 (1990); United States v. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 30-31 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 65 (1990); United States v. Wilson, 896
F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1990). Nor is the extent of a downward departure,
should the court elect to depart at all, a subject for appellate review.
United States v. Sharp, 931 F.2d 1310, 1311 (8th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Pomerleau, 923 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir. 1991); United States
v. Weaver, 920 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Vizcarra-Angulo, 904 F.2d 22, 23 (9th Cir. 1990).
b. Diminished Mental Capacity. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, p.s., provides
that the sentencing court may downwardly depart if a defendant
has committed "a non-violent offense while suffering from signif-
icantly reduced mental capacity." (emphasis added). Courts have
generally agreed that the negative implication of this language is
that a court may not depart on the basis of reduced capacity if
defendant has committed a violent offense. See United States v.
Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc); United States v.
Russell, 917 F.2d 512, 517 (11th Cir. 1990).
c. Miscellaneous Non-Grounds. None of the following justifies a
downward departure: (a) a good employment record, U.S.S.G.
§ 5H1.5; (b) family responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6; (c) personal
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financial difficulty, "under even extraordinary circumstances," United
States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 919 n.2 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12); (d) significant charitable contributions, United
States v. McHan, 920 F.2d 244, 247-48 (4th Cir. 1990); or (e) to
allow the defendant to make restitution to victims, United States v.
Bolden, 889 F.2d 1336, 1340 (4th Cir. 1989).
d. Government's Refusal to Make "Substantial Assistance" Mo-
tion. Where the Government agrees in a plea agreement to move
for a downward departure if the defendant provides "substantial
assistance" per U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, and at sentencing the Government
refuses to so move, the defendant must be given an opportunity to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Government
has breached the plea agreement. United States v. Conner, 930 F.2d
1073, 1076-77 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 420 (1991); cf.
United States v. Raynor, 939 F.2d 191, 195 (1991) in which the
court refused to extend this right to cases in which no such provision
appears in the plea agreement (except insofar as there is "substantial
showing" of Government's "unconstitutional motive" per Wade v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992)).
For further discussion of downward departures, see supra par-
agraph I.B.7.
10. Upward Departures. As the court stated in United States v. Hum-
mer, 916 F.2d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1608 (1991),
upward departures are reviewed on appeal in this way:
We review departures from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines
range under a multi-part test of "reasonableness" derived from our
reading of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742 in conjunction with 18 U.S.C.A. §
3553(b). United States v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1990).
Under this test, we first examine de novo the specific reasons cited
by the district court in support of its sentence outside the Guidelines
range to ascertain whether those reasons encompass factors "not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the guidelines." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b). If the
sentencing court identified one or more factors potentially warrant-
ing departure, we apply a clearly erroneous standard and review
the factual support in the record for those identified circumstances.
Upon ascertaining that there is an adequate factual basis for the
factors, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to determine if,
on balance, the cited departure factors are of sufficient importance
in the case such that a sentence outside the Guidelines range "should
result." Id. Similarly, we apply an abuse of discretion standard to
determine if the extent of departure was reasonable.
See also United States v. Palinkas, 938 F.2d 456, 461 (4th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Chester, 919 F.2d 896, 900 (4th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Summers, 893 F.2d 63, 67 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, the district court is authorized to depart
upward when the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the
defendant's criminal history or where it is determined that the defendant is
likely to commit more crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 913 F.2d
136, 138-39 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. McKenley, 895 F.2d 184, 185-
86 (4th Cir. 1990).
For further discussion of upward departures, see supra paragraph I.B.8.
11. Restitution. In determining restitution, the trial court must make
"explicit fact findings" regarding "the amount of the loss sustained by the
victim as a result of the offense, the financial needs and earning ability of
the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as
the court deems appropriate." 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (Supp. III 1991); United
States v. Bruchey, 810 F.2d 456, 458-59 (4th Cir. 1987). Failure to make
the required findings of fact may cause the appellate court to vacate and
remand for resentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Sharp, 927 F.2d 170,
174 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 139 (1991).
Restitution by installment payments must be completed by the end of
probation, or within five years after the end of a term of imprisonment.
18 U.S.C. § 3663(0(2) (1988); Bruchey, 810 F.2d at 460.
Finally, unless there is a specific agreement with the defendant to the
contrary, the Victim and Witness Protection Act authorizes "restitution
only for the loss [resulting from] the offense of conviction." Hughey v.
United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990) (footnote omitted). In other words,
absent an agreement, the court is not authorized to order restitution for
amounts charged in other counts or for "related conduct."
For further discussion of restitution, see supra paragraph I.B.12.
12. Factual Findings by District Court.
a. Facts in Presentence Report. "Without an affirmative showing
the information is inaccurate, the court is 'free to adopt the findings
of the [presentence report] without more specific inquiry or expla-
nation."' United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990)
(quoting United States v. Mueller, 902 F.2d 336, 346 (5th Cir.
1990)); see United States v. Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 881 (4th Cir.
1991) (stating that appellate court should apply "clearly erroneous"
standard to factual determinations by district court).
b. Stipulation in Plea Agreement. Where there is a discrepancy
between the presentence report and a stipulation in a plea agreement
"[t]he court is not bound by the stipulation but may with the aid
of the presentence report, determine the facts relevant to sentenc-
ing." U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4, Policy Statement; see United States v.
Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1079 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 2066 (1991).
c. Acquitted Conduct. Acquitted conduct may be considered at
sentencing if it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See,
e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 376 n.1 (1989);
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United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713, 716-17 (4th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1690 (1992); United States v. Morgan, 942
F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Averi, 922 F.2d 765
(11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d
177, 181 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 127 (1991); United
States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 1989). Also, see the
cases supporting a firearm enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)
after acquittal on an 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge, discussed supra in
paragraph II.A.8.
d. Scope of Information/Hearsay. In finding facts relative to
sentencing, the court is entitled to consider any information it
considers to be sufficiently reliable, including reliable hearsay. 18
U.S.C. § 3661 (1988); United States v. Bowman, 926 F.2d 380, 381
(4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Wilson, 896 F.2d 856 (4th Cir.
1990); U.S.S.G. § 6A1.2, Commentary, § 6A1.3(a).
e. Waiver. Failure to object to factual inaccuracies in a presentence
report at sentencing constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal. United
States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Heilprin, 910 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir. 1990). For further
discussion of waiver of appellate review by failure to object, see
infra paragraphs II.D.13 & 47.
f. Standard of Review on Appeal. In general, factual findings are
reviewed on appeal-if they are reviewed at all-under the "clearly
erroneous" standard. United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1444
(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Curtis, 934 F.2d 553, 556 (4th Cir.
1991).
13. Appeal of Sentencing Errors Generally. Sentencing errors cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal. Wren v. United States, 540 F.2d 643,
644 n.1 (4th Cir. 1975). The adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines has not
changed the basic requirement that one must preserve issues for review by
presenting them to the district court. See United States v. Taylor, 868 F.2d
125, 127 (5th Cir. 1989). When no objection is made at the sentencing
hearing, such a failure results in waiver unless the district court committed
"plain error." United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186-87 (4th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Rivers, 929 F.2d 136, 139-40 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 431 (1991); United States v. Tibesar, 894 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 79 (1990); FED. R. CiuM. P. 52(b).
The plain error rule authorizes this Court to correct only "particularly
egregious errors" that "seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1,
15 (1985). The plain error exception should be used "sparingly, solely in
those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result." Id. Moreover, "questions of fact capable of resolution by the
district court upon proper objection at sentencing can never constitute plain
error." United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2032 (1991).
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For further discussion of the effect of failure to object on appellate
review, see supra paragraph II.D.12.e and infra paragraph II.D.47.
14. Sentences Within Guidelines Range/Overlapping Ranges. It is en-
tirely within the district court's discretion to fix the sentence at any point
within the Guidelines range, United States v. Roberts, 881 F.2d 95, 106-07
(4th Cir. 1989), and its decision is not appealable as long as the range is
correctly calculated. United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 794 (4th Cir.
1990); see also Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112, 1121 (1992)
(selection of sentence from within Guidelines range is decision left solely to
sentencing court).
Similarly, where there is a dispute over which of two overlapping
Guidelines ranges is applicable, the district court makes it clear that a certain
sentence will be imparted irrespective of which range is applicable, and then
sentences at a point falling in both ranges, such a sentence is not reviewable
on appeal. United States v. Smith, 914 F.2d 565, 569 n.3 (4th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 999 (1991); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427,
432-33 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925, 931
(2d Cir. 1988).
15. Disparity of Co-Defendant's Sentence. A defendant may not chal-
lenge his sentence merely because a co-defendant received a lighter sentence.
United States v. Kant, 946 F.2d 267, 270 n.3 (4th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789, 794 n.5 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Goff,
907 F.2d 1441, 1447 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Foutz, 865 F.2d 617,
621 (4th Cir. 1989).
16. Sentencing Credit for Pretrial Detention or Release. Claims for
credit on a sentence for either pretrial detention or release must be first
presented to the Attorney General of the United States after a defendant
has begun to serve his sentence. United States v. Wilson, 112 S. Ct. 1351
(1992); 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (1988). Therefore, a district court is not
authorized to award credit for time served in official detention, or on some
kind of restricted release, at sentencing. Wilson, 112 S. Ct. at 1353-56.
17. State Mandatory Minimums Under Assimilated Crimes Act. Sen-
tences for violations of state statutes assimilated under 18 U.S.C. § 13
(1988) must fall within the minimum and maximum terms established by
state law. United States v. Young, 916 F.2d 147, 150-51 (4th Cir. 1990);
see United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250, 251-52 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1991) (holding that federal court must apply state
mandatory minimum sentence under Guidelines).
18. Other Challenges to Length of Sentence. In addition to disputes
over Sentencing Guidelines issues and ranges, defendants occasionally contest
the length of their sentences on other grounds.
a. More Lengthy Sentence After Trial. The Supreme Court has
consistently rejected Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges to more
lengthy sentences given after trial than to co-defendants or others
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who plead guilty. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,
218-26 (1978); United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (4th
Cir. 1992) (discussing cases), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3480 (U.S.
Jan. 11, 1993) (No. 92-6157).
b. Ex Post Facto Defense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) requires the
court to apply the Guideline that is in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced, giving a defendant the benefit of any
favorable amendment between commission of the offense and the
date of sentencing. However, the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes
application of an amended guideline which is unfavorable to the
defendant. See Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987) (applying
Clause to state guideline sentencing scheme); United States v. Mor-
row, 925 F.2d 779, 782-83 (4th Cir. 1991).
The exception to this general rule are so-called "straddle con-
spiracies," discussed supra in paragraph II.B.1. The courts have
consistently held that applying the Sentencing Guidelines to straddle
conspiracies or similar ongoing criminal conduct violates neither the
Due Process Clause nor the Ex Post Facto Clause. See United States
v. Meitinger, 901 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.) ("In this case, the conspiracy
continued after the effective date of the Guidelines, and thus the
Guidelines are applicable in this case"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
519 (1990); United States v. Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 845 (4th Cir.)
("We agree with our sister circuits that the application of the
Guidelines to an ongoing conspiracy does not in any way violate
the [E]x [P]ost [F]acto clause"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 432 (1990).
c. Eighth Amendment Defenses. "Proportionality review" under
the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against "cruel and unusual
punishment" is limited to sentences of death or life without parole.
United States v. Polk, 905 F.2d 54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 519 (1990); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39 (4th Cir.
1990). Further, even when a life sentence is imposed, it will be
affirmed on appeal unless "grossly disproportionate" to the crime
committed. Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1981).
For further discussion of length of sentences, see supra paragraph
I.E.34.
19. Intended Versus Actual Offense Conduct. Under the Sentencing
Guidelines, intended offense conduct carries the same weight as actual
conduct. United States v. Depew, 932 F.2d 324, 330 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 210 (1991); United States v. Medeiros, 897 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.
1990) (fact that additional acts were necessary to complete conspiracy did
not render intended outcome "speculative" within meaning of commentary
to U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1).
20. Resentencing in Defendant's Absence. Under FED. R. CluM. P.
43, a defendant is only required to be present where the sentence is increased,
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or where the entire sentence is vacated and the case remanded for resent-
encing. United States v. Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1497 (11th Cir. 1991);
Rust v. United States, 725 F.2d 1153, 1154 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) (presence not required at key
stages of trial where presence would be useless).
C. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
1. Probable Cause. In appellate review of a Magistrate's probable
cause determination, "great deference" is to be shown to the Magistrate's
assessment of the facts presented to him in support of a search warrant.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); United States v. Blackwood,
913 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331
(4th Cir. 1984). "[T]he task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de
novo determination of probable cause, but only to determine whether there
is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate's decision to
issue the warrant." Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984).
However, to the extent the facts are undisputed and the challenge to the
search warrant is on a purely legal basis, appellate review is de novo. United
States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 111
(1991).
Probable cause to arrest exists if the totality of the circumstances would
cause a reasonable person to believe a crime has been committed, Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), taking
into account information received from informants. United States v. Porter,
738 F.2d 622, 625-26 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984);
United States v. Shepherd, 714 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 938 (1984); United States v. Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1072 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980). For a case discussing probable
cause to arrest in the context of an investigative stop by a drug interdiction
unit, see United States v. Aguiar, 825 F.2d 39, 41 (4th Cir.) (officer's
observation of bulge and white plastic on suspect's ankle combined with
other "drug profile characteristics" constitutes probable cause to arrest),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 987 (1987).
2. Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant. The reliability of an
informant's information used in an affidavit in support of a search warrant
may be inferred from the factual circumstances, even if the affidavit is
otherwise devoid of any stated reasons why the informant is believed to be
reliable. United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 111 (1991). Likewise, the fact-based conclusion of experienced
law enforcement personnel that evidence is likely to be found at a particular
location may be relied upon in making the probable cause determination.
United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075 (l1th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111
S. Ct. 259 (1990); United States -v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Foster, 711 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103
(1984); see United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727, 729 (4th Cir. 1988)
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(finding probable cause where officer told of pistol by informants), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1031 (1989).
It is well settled that an affidavit in support of a search warrant may
be based in whole or in part on hearsay information so long as it has
sufficient indicia of reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 103 (1965); United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 265 (1990);
FED. R. CIUm. P. 41(c)(1). The fact that an informant is admitting to a
crime or providing information in hopes of leniency for past crimes are
"indicia of reliability" of the information provided. United States v. Harris,
403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971); United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 699 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 111 (1991). Moreover, tips from different
informants (multiple hearsay sources) may properly be used to establish
probable cause. United States v. Landis, 726 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir.)
("Interlocking tips from different confidential informants enhance the cred-
ibility of each"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230 (1984).
3. Description of Items to be Seized. A generic description of items
to be seized pursuant to a search warrant (e.g., "ledgers, papers, books,
records") is sufficient to meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity re-
quirement. United States v. Peagler, 847 F.2d 756, 757 (lth Cir. 1988);
United States v. Shilling, 826 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1043 (1988); see also United States v. Fawole, 785 F.2d 1141, 1144
(4th Cir. 1986) (finding search warrant for "address books, diaries," and
other items sufficiently specific).
4. Anticipatory Search Warrants. Anticipatory search warrants are
permissible when contraband "is on a sure course to its destination." United
States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1988); see United States v.
Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1005 (1989).
5. Franks Hearing. In order to be entitled to a hearing pursuant to
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), commonly referred to as a Franks
hearing, a defendant must make a "dual showing ... which incorporates
both a subjective and an objective threshold component." First, the defen-
dant "must make 'a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement
knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit."' Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-
56. Secondly, the offending information must be essential to the probable
cause determination; if the offending information is excluded and probable
cause still remains, no Franks hearing is required. Id.; see United States v.
Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 1990) (must show that agent affirma-
tively tried to mislead Magistrate to warrant Franks hearing; ambiguity or
lack of clarity is insufficient).
6. Police-Citizen Encounters Versus "Seizure" of Person. The Fourth
Circuit continues to emphasize in so-called "police-citizen encounters" that
whether an individual has been "seized" is determined by whether a
reasonable person would have believed that he or she was "free to leave."
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United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 131 (1990); United States v. Alpert, 816 F.2d 958, 960 (4th Cir. 1987);
see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980). The Fourth Amendment is defi-
nitely not violated, the Court repeatedly points out, when the police simply
approach a person in a public place and ask that person to answer some
questions. Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991); Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 497 (1983); United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 711-12 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2895 (1991); United States v. Gray, 883
F.2d 320, 322-23 (4th Cir. 1989); cf. United States v. Wilson, 953 F.2d 116
(4th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction resulting from police-citizen encounter
which developed into unlawful seizure).
The district court's determination whether a seizure occurred is factual
in nature and will be overturned on appeal only if "clearly erroneous."
United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1990); United States
v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 937-38 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131
(1990); United States v. Clark, 891 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Porter, 738 F.2d 622, 625 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 983 (1984).
7. Investigative Stop/"Reasonable Suspicion." Another recurring issue
on appeal was what constitutes "reasonable suspicion" to justify a so-called
"investigative stop" or brief "investigative detention" per United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
The Court continues to point out that the requisite "reasonable suspicion"
is more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' but
less than probable cause, Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; United States v. Gooding,
695 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1982). The existence of "reasonable suspicion" is
determined under a "totality of the circumstances" test, and may even be
based upon anonymous informant tips if there has been independent cor-
roboration of the veracity of the information provided. Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1990); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18
(1981); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1989).
Because the intrusion created by an investigatory stop and frisk is
minimal, the reasonable suspicion standard is not onerous. See, e.g., United
States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir..) (officer's nighttime obser-
vation of man walking away from otherwise deserted area where burglar
alarm had just gone off constitutes reasonable suspicion to stop man), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987); United States v. Turner, 933 F.2d 240, 242-
44 (4th Cir. 1991) (officer with experience in narcotics investigations had
reasonable suspicion to stop and determine whether she was "cooking"
illegal drugs after observing her carry cup of water out of convenience
store, walk to car, and lean over front seat as if to hide something).
Moreover, if reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect exists, the officer
is entitled to conduct a frisk and limited search for weapons to protect
himself. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (search should be "confined in scope to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments
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for the assault of the police officer"); United States v. Brockington, 849
F.2d 872, 876 (4th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that guns are common tool of
drug trade); United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107-08 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965 (1987).
The standard of review of an investigative stop on appeal is twofold.
Underlying factual determinations are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous"
standard. United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Porter, 738 F.2d 622, 625 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 983 (1984). The determination of whether the particular facts
constitute "reasonable suspicion" is reviewed de novo.
8. Protective Sweep Searches. Protective sweep searches of buildings
incident to the arrest of persons in or immediately outside a dwelling or
building are permissible to protect the safety of the arresting police officers.
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); United States v. Hoyos, 892 F.2d
1387, 1397 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 80 (1990); United States
v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Baker, 577 F.2d
1147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850 (1978).
9. Consent to Search. Another recurring appellate issue is whether a
defendant's alleged "consent to search" was knowing and voluntary. The
question of voluntariness likewise turns on the "totality of the circum-
stances," which the Government must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); United States
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 248-49 (1973). Whether a defendant had the requisite understanding
of the English language to knowingly consent to a search is a question of
fact, but in no event is the Government required to show that a defendant
knew he had the right to refuse consent. United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d
932, 938 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990).
Agents are not required to disclose their true identity to obtain valid
consent. Nor are agents required to disclose their true purpose for wishing
to enter the premises. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 208-10
(1966). "A government agent may obtain an invitation onto property by
misrepresenting his identity, and if invited, does not need probable cause
nor warrant to enter so long as he does not exceed the scope of his
invitation." United States v. Scherer, 673 F.2d 176, 182 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 457 U.S. 1120 (1982).
A third party otherwise put in charge of certain property or premises
may validly consent to its search. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
Moreover, even if a third party giving consent did not, in fact, have
authority to do so, the search will be upheld if the officer reasonably
believed the third party had authority to consent. See Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177 (1990).
On appeal, the district court's findings are deemed to be factual in
nature and therefore will be affirmed unless "clearly erroneous." United
States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 938 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131
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(1990); United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Poole, 718 F.2d 671, 674 (4th Cir. 1983).
10. Searches Incident to Arrest. Searches incident to arrest are another
well-established exception to the warrant requirement. United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). Where officers have probable cause
to arrest (independent of whatever is found in the search), a search imme-
diately before arrest also qualifies as a "search incident to arrest." United
States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 698-99 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
111 (1991).
Warrantless arrests-and searches incident thereto-are permitted where
there is probable cause to believe a felony is being or has been committed,
based upon "the totality of the circumstances." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 230-31 (1983); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); United
States v. McGraw, 920 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir. 1990).
A valid arrest warrant carries with it the authority to enter the home
of the person to be arrested, assuming there is reason to believe the person
may be inside. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980). Once
validly inside the house, other principles relative to search and seizure may
apply, including particularly searches incident to arrest and the plain view
doctrine.
11. Good Faith Exception. A finding by the district court that other-
wise improperly seized evidence is admissible under the good faith exception
per United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), is reviewed on appeal de
novo. United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1031 (1989); United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 139 (9th Cir.
1988); United States v. Edwards, 798 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1986). Both at the
district court and appellate levels the inquiry is whether good faith reliance
on an otherwise invalid search warrant is objectively reasonable, that is,
whether "a reasonably well-trained officer ... [would] have known that
the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization." Leon, 468 at
922 n.23.
12. Abandoned Property/Denial of Ownership. Those who are found
to have abandoned property have no standing to challenge its seizure. Abel
v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960); United States v. Flowers, 912
F.2d 707, 711 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2895 (1991); United
States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1976). Consequently, if a
suspect denies ownership of certain property, he loses standing he may have
otherwise had to contest its seizure. See Rawlings v. Keniucky, 448 U.S.
98, 104 (1980).
13. Vehicle Searches. Vehicles and any containers found in vehicles
may be searched without a warrant when the search is incident to a lawful
arrest. California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981);
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 (1980); United States v. Taylor,
857 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335,
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1342 (4th Cir. 1981). Vehicles which are in the lawful custody of law
enforcement may also be searched for inventory purposes without a warrant.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); United States v. Brown,
787 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 837 (1986); see also
United States v. Chavis, 880 F.2d 788 (4th Cir. 1989) (passage of time
between arrest and vehicle search does not invalidate finding of probable
cause for conducting warrantless search).
A third party in sole possession of a vehicle belonging to another has
authority to consent to its search. United States v. Dunkley, 911 F.2d 522,
526 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. dgnied, 111 S. Ct. 765 (1991).
14. Standing to Challenge/Expectation of Privacy. To challenge the
legality of a search under the Fourth Amendment a defendant must have
"a reasonable expectation of privacy" in the place to be searched. Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). A reasonable expectation of privacy
is not created by the subjective expectation of the defendant alone; the
court must look at the defendant's interest and control in the area searched,
the measures taken by the defendant to ensure privacy, and society's
willingness to recognize defendant's expectation as reasonable. United States
v. Horowitz, 806 F.2d 1222, 1225 (4th Cir. 1986); see also California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in
garbage left on street curb); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
United States v. Brown, 743 F.2d 1505, 1507 (11th Cir. 1984).
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has held that "Fourth Amendment rights
are ... personal rights," which co-defendants "lack standing to assert
vicariously." United States v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210, 214 (4th Cir. 1988)
(noting that adult defendants had no standing to challenge constitutionality
of search of juvenile on whom drugs for which adults were prosecuted were
found); see also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973).
D. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Venue. Challenges to the venue cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Failure to raise venue objections in the district court constitutes
waiver. United States v. Santiesteban, 825 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1987).
2. Use Immunity. Promise by the Government not to use information
provided by a defendant in further prosecutions does not prevent the
Government from using the information in that prosecution. United States
v. Reckmeyer, 786 F.2d 1216, 1224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850
(1986).
3. Double Jeopardy.
a. State and Federal Prosecutions. Prosecution in both federal and
state court for exactly the same criminal conduct is not double
jeopardy. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985); Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United States v. laquinta, 674
F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Musgrove, 581 F.2d
406 (4th Cir. 1978).
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b. Multiple Punishments. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
multiple punishments for the same offense. Grady v. Corbin, 495
U.S. 508 (1990); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302
(1932); United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 639, 642 (4th Cir. 1991);
see Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990); Serfass v. United
States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975) (finding that jeopardy attaches in
jury trial when jury is empaneled and sworn, and in bench trial
when court begins to hear evidence).
However, neither the Double Jeopardy clause nor the Sentencing
Guidelines prohibit a court from considering prior criminal conduct
as the basis for an enhancement to the sentence for a subsequent
offense. United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1992).
Similarly, cumulative punishments for separate offenses are not
barred by the Double Jeopardy clause, Garrett v. United States,
471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985), and so-called "double counting" of
criminal convictions through various Sentencing Guidelines enhance-
ments is permissible unless expressly prohibited. United States v.
Curtis, 934 F.2d 553, 556 (4th Cir. 1991); U.S.S.G. § 4Al.1, cmt.;
see also United States v. Shavers, 820 F.2d 1375, 1377 (4th Cir.
1987) (convictions for armed bank robbery and use of firearm
during commission of violent crime, that is, bank robbery, is not
double jeopardy); and the related discussion in supra paragraph
IA.1 (Continuing Criminal Enterprise).
For further discussion of double jeopardy, see supra paragraph
I.E.3.
4. Joinder and Severance of Defendants.
a. Generally. Generally, persons indicted together should be tried
together, unless joint trial would result in a miscarriage of justice.
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987); United States v.
Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 114 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Pryba, 900 F.2d 748, 758 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 305
(1990); United States v. Odom, 888 F.2d 1014, 1017 (4th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 44 (1990); United States v. Brugman, 655
F.2d 540, 542 (4th Cir. 1981). "The grant or denial of a motion
for severance under Rule 14 lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court and its action on such a motion will be overturned only
when there has been a clear abuse of such discretion ... [because]
the denial of a severance deprive[d] the movant a fair trial and
result[ed] in a miscarriage of justice." United States v. Santoni,
585 F.2d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979)
(citations omitted).
b. Jury Instructions. Rather than the more radical remedy of
severance of defendants, the courts have long emphasized the ade-
quacy of limiting instructions to the jury. See, e.g., Yates v. Evatt,
111 S. Ct. 1884, 1893 (1991); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200,
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206-11 (1987); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985)
("Absent... extraordinary situations ... we adhere to the crucial
assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by jury
that jurors carefully follow instructions"); Opper v. United States,
348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) ("To say that the jury might have been
confused amounts to nothing more than an unfounded speculation
that the jurors disregarded clear instructions of the court in arriving
at their verdict. Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury
to follow instructions"); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604,
618-19 (1953); Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896);
United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The
jury is generally presumed to be able to follow an instruction to
disregard evidence, absent some strong indication that the evidence
is so powerful that a jury could not ignore it and that the defendant
would be harmed as a result"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 683 (1991);
United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1987) ("No
prejudice exists if the jury could make individual guilt determina-
tions by following the court's cautionary instructions, appraising
the independent evidence against each defendant"), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 934 (1988). For further discussion of jury instructions, see
supra paragraph I.E.31 (Jury Instructions); and infra paragraphs
II.D. 17 (Voir Dire/Right to Impartial Jury) and II.D.39 (Jury
Instructions).
c. Nontestifying Co-Defendant's Confession. Severance is not re-
quired when a nontestifying codefendant's confession is admitted
in a joint trial with a proper limiting instruction, provided that the
confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name,
but any reference to his or her existence. Marsh, 481 U.S. at 211.
The Fourth Circuit has extended the holding in Marsh to allow the
admission of a confession in which the defendant's name has been
replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun. United States v. Vogt,
910 F.2d 1184, 1191-92 (4th Cir. 1990) (Phillips, J.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 955 (1991). See also the discussion of this subject in
supra paragraph I.E.16 (Co-Conspirator Statements), and infra
paragraph II.D.20 (Prior Statements of Witnesses).
d. Rule 404(b) Evidence Against Co-Defendant. Severance is not
required when Rule 404(b) evidence is admitted against a codefen-
dant, as long as an appropriate limiting instruction is given to the
jury. See, e.g., United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 324-25
(D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990); United States
v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Rosenwasser, 550 F.2d 806, 808-09 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
825 (1977); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 175 (3d
Cir. 1986); United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 359 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981); United States v. White,
788 F.2d 390, 394 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Tuchow, 768
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F.2d 855, 865 n.10 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Robinson, 774
F.2d 261, 266-67 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Escalante, 637
F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980);
United States v. McClure, 734 F.2d 484, 492 (10th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Silien, 825 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1987).
For further discussion of joinder and severance, see supra paragraph
I.E.13.
5. Bill of Particulars. A district court's denial of the defendant's
motion for a bill of particulars is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of
discretion standard. United States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135, 1153 (4th
Cir. 1986). In order to show abuse of discretion, a defendant must prove
that he suffered unfair surprise. United States v. Jackson, 757 F.2d 1486
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985). Moreover, if the Government
has an "open file policy," this is taken into account in determining whether
the degree of detail known by the defendant is constitutionally adequate.
United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 849 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 871 (1979). In any event, providing a defendant with additional
discovery is not a proper basis for ordering a bill of particulars. See, e.g.,
United States v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 405
(4th Cir. 1985) ("A bill of particulars is not to be used to provide detailed
disclosure of the government's evidence in advance of trial").
6. Miranda Issues/Confessions Generally.
a. Voluntariness of Confession. Issues related to the voluntariness
of confessions continue to arise with some frequency. The governing
principles of law:
(1) Generally. Involuntary confessions are subject to "harmless
error" analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1253-
54 (1991).
(2) Standard on Appeal. An appellate court independently
reviews the question of a confession's voluntariness, but defers
to the district court's pertinent findings of fact unless "clearly
erroneous." Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348
(1976); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1072 (4th Cir.
1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988). Further, when a
finding of voluntariness is based on the credibility of witnesses
even greater deference to the district court's determination is
required. United States v. Locklear, 829 F.2d 1314, 1317 (4th
Cir. 1987).
(3) Totality of Circumstances Test. The appellate court must
determine, under the totality of the circumstances, whether
law enforcement agents have overborne the defendant's will
or left his "capacity for self-determination critically impaired."
Pelton, 835 F.2d at 1071 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973)); United States v. Wertz, 625 F.2d
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1128, 1134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980); see
also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (coercive
police activity necessary predicate to finding confession invol-
untary); 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1988) (providing considerations
for trial judge in determining voluntariness of confession).
The totality of the circumstances include the defendant's individual char-
acteristics and background, the setting in which the confession occurred,
and the details of any interrogation which preceded it. Pelton, 835 F.2d at
1071. A voluntary confession need not be entirely free of intimidation. Id.
at 1072. Nor must inculpatory statements be suppressed merely because a
defendant subjectively now believes a confession was "involuntary." United
States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397, 403 (4th Cir. 1985).
(4) Voluntary Appearance. A suspect's voluntary appearance
at a police station (or, by clear implication, at an agent's
office) is evidence of voluntariness of any subsequent state-
ment. United States v. Fazio, 914 F.2d 950, 956 (7th Cir.
1990).
(5) Evidentiary Hearing. The provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)
(1988) do not require a district court to conduct an evidentiary
hearing and rule on the voluntariness of a confession unless
a defendant objects to its introduction or otherwise moves the
court for a determination of voluntariness. United States v.
Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 173 (4th Cir. 1990).
(6) Jury Instruction. The district court should instruct the jury
specifically on the law governing the use of a confession,
whether or not the defendant requests the court to do so,
United States v. Sauls, 520 F.2d 568, 570 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1021 (1975); United States v. Inman, 352
F.2d 954, 956 (4th Cir. 1965). However, although "it is plain
error to fail to give such specific instruction, reversal will not
follow if the failure may be deemed non-prejudicial and harm-
less," Sauls, 520 F.2d at 570.
b. Miranda Warnings
(1) When Required. Miranda warnings are required when
express questioning of a person either in custody or its func-
tional equivalent takes place. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420 (1984) (Miranda applies only to custodial interrogation);
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, the taking of basic
personal information such as identity does not constitute in-
terrogation. United States v. Taylor, 799 F.2d 126 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1093 (1987). Nor do casual
conversation or statements of agents about evidence which are
not designed to elicit an incriminating response constitute
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interrogation. United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1680 (1992).
(2) Nontestifying Co-defendant's Confession. To be admissi-
ble, the confessions of nontestifying co-defendants must be
redacted and otherwise comply with the requirements of Bru-
ton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) and Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987), discussed further in supra para-
graphs I.E.16 (Co-conspirator Statements) and II.D.4.c (Join-
der and Severance of Defendants/Non-Testifying Co-
Defendant's Confession), and infra paragraph II.D.20 (Prior
Statements of Witnesses).
(3) Public Safety Exception. Per the limited "public safety
exception" to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), carved
out by the Supreme Court in New Orleans v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649 (1984), pre-Miranda questioning at the scene of an
arrest regarding weapons, drug use, or other matters specifi-
cally connected to the safety of officers or nearby members
of the public is permissible.
(4) Harmless Error. If there is a Miranda violation, a further
inquiry must be made into whether the error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Ramirez, 710
F.2d 535, 542-43 (9th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Zahradnick, 632
F.2d 353, 360-61 (4th Cir. 1980).
7. Brady Issues. Under Brady v. Maryland; 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), a
defendant has a right to receive on request any exculpatory information in
the Government's possession, which right has been subsequently held to
include "impeachment evidence." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
676 (1985). To show a Brady violation a defendant must demonstrate (1)
that the evidence was favorable to the defense, (2) that the evidence was
material, and (3) that the prosecution suppressed the evidence. See United
States v. Warhop, 732 F.2d 775, 778 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Moore v.
Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972)).
Care must be taken not to allow defendants to use Brady requests as
a pretext for broader discovery. "There is no general constitutional right
to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one." Weatherford
v. Bursey, 424 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); see United States v. Polowichak, 783
F.2d 410, 414 (4th Cir. 1986).
As to the showing that Brady materials are sufficiently favorable to the
defense, see United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1029 (4th Cir. 1978)
(mere speculation by counsel is not adequate to establish that material was
exculpatory under Brady), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979). As to whether
the evidence is sufficiently material, the nondisclosure "amounts to a
constitutional violation ... and the conviction must be reversed, only if
the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confi-
dence in the outcome of the trial." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (citing United
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States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976)). "The evidence is material only
if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Bagley,
473 U.S. at 682; see Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82, 87 (4th Cir. 1991).
Finally, a Brady violation is not shown "where the exculpatory infor-
mation is not only available to the defendant but also lies in a source where
a reasonable defendant would have looked." United States v. Wilson, 901
F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir. 1990).
8. Jencks Act Materials. In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1957), the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant had a due process
right to inspect, for impeachment purposes, statements which had been
made to government agents by government witnesses. Such statements were
to be turned over to the defense at the time of cross-examination if their
contents related to the subject matter of the witness' direct testimony and
if a demand had been made for specific statements of the witness. Id. at
667-72. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, was enacted to codify the Jencks
decision.
In spite of the practice of many U.S. Attorney's offices to turn over
Jencks material in advance of trial, per the plain language of the statute,
the defendant has no right to pretrial discovery. See, e.g., United States v.
Peoples, 748 F.2d 934, 936 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1067
(1985); United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 693-94 (4th Cir. 1973),
aff'd, 417 U.S. 211 (1974). The legislative history of the Act is in accord.
H.R. CoNu. REP. No. 1271, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957), reprinted in
1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1869, 1869-70; S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
1-5 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1861, 1861-64.
A district court's factual findings regarding Jencks Act material are
reviewed on appeal under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v.
Escamilla, 467 F.2d 34.1 (4th Cir. 1972). A district court's denial of a
defendant's motion to exclude testimony for a Jencks violation is reviewed
under the abuse of discretion standard. Imperial Colliery Co. v. Oxy USA
Inc., 912 F.2d 696, 705 (4th Cir. 1990). In the absence of bad faith or
prejudice, the failure to disclose Jencks Act material will not result in
reversal. This is particularly true where the prior statements are not produced
because they have been lost or misplaced in the interim. See Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (unless defendant can show bad faith on
behalf of government, failure to preserve evidence does not result in denial
of due process).
9. Disclosure of Confidential Informant. A confidential informant's
identity may be guarded from disclosure without impinging on a defendant's
Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. McCrary v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
Disclosure is required only when his testimony is highly relevant to the
defense or essential to the fair determination of a cause. Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957). Ex parte consideration of evidence or
testimony concerning a confidential informant is a widely-used procedure
which allows the court to balance two conflicting needs that arise in cases
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such as this: the need to protect the identity of informants and the
testimonial privilege traditionally afforded them, and the need to guard
against police perjury. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068,
1072-73 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976); United States
v. Fisher, 440 F.2d 654, 656 (4th Cir. 1971) (identity of informant used
only to obtain search warrant need not be disclosed).
For further discussion of the Government's duty to disclose a confiden-
tial informant's identity, see supra paragraph I.E. 13.
10. Waiver of Right to Counsel. A criminal defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right of self-representation, but his decision must be intelligent
and knowing. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); United States v.
Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 559 (4th Cir. 1985). A waiver of the right to counsel,
though not explicit, can be found from the circumstances. See United States
v. Davis, 958 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 223 (1992). Refusal
to proceed with competent counsel without good cause is sufficient to show
a voluntary waiver of counsel. United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 109
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1211 (1988). A court's failure to inquire
whether the defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent is not reversible
error where the court finds the defendant is rejecting competent counsel for
purposes of delay. Id. at 110-11. For further discussion of waiver of counsel,
see supra paragraph I.E. 9.
11. Counsel's Motion to Withdraw. A district court is free to allow
or deny an attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel unless there is a
showing of an actual conflict adversely affecting representation. See Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-50 (1980); United States v. Hanley, 974 F.2d
14 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 375 (4th Cir.
(1991); United States v. Gallop, 838 F.2d 105 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1211 (1988). For further discussion of counsel's motion to withdraw,
see supra paragraph I.E.10.
12. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. Denial of a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea after Rule 11 proceedings have generally been upheld on
appeal. See United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (affirming trial court's denial of defendant's request to withdraw his
guilty plea based on substantial misunderstanding of applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range); United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir.)
(affirming rejection of defendant's attempt to withdraw guilty plea because
defendant did not carry burden of showing plea was not knowing or
voluntary), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 171 (1991); United States v. Pitino, 887
F.2d 42, 46 (4th Cir. 1989) (denying withdrawal of guilty plea because
defendant failed to show plea was not knowing or voluntary); United States
v. DeFreitas, 865 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1989) (denying motion to withdraw
guilty plea due to claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at time plea
entered); United States v. Haley, 784 F.2d 1218 (4th Cir. 1986) (denying
motion to change guilty plea because defendant failed to show any fair and
just reason why guilty plea was invalid). Reviewing under an "abuse of
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discretion" standard, Pitino, 887 F.2d at 46, the Fourth Circuit has em-
phasized the following factors to be considered in determining whether a
"fair and just reason" exists to warrant post Rule 11 withdrawal of a guilty
plea: (1) whether the defendant provided credible evidence that his plea was
not knowing or voluntary; (2) whether the defendant credibly asserted his
legal innocence; (3) whether there was a delay between entering the plea
and moving for withdrawal; (4) whether the defendant had close assistance
of counsel; (5) whether withdrawal will prejudice the government; and (6)
whether withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources.
Moore, 931 F.2d at 248; FED. R. CIUIA. P. 32(d).
For further discussion of motions to withdraw a guilty plea, see supra
paragraph I.E.8.
13. Government Breach of Plea Agreement. The Supreme Court has
held that a defendant is entitled to enforcement of the promises and
provisions in his plea agreement, which create a kind of constitutionally
based right of contract. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971);
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984); see also United States v.
Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1986) (broken Government promise
which induced guilty plea implicates due process because it impairs volun-
tariness and intelligence of plea, and also undermines "honor of the
government [and] public confidence in the fair administration of justice").
14. Motions to Continue. Whether to grant a motion to continue is
within the broad discretion of the district court. United States v. Bakker,
925 F.2d 728, 735 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Kosko, 870 F.2d 162
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989); United States v. Wilson, 721
F.2d 967, 972 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the district court's denial of a
continuance will only be reversed for abuse of discretion, when the denial
is "so arbitrary and so fundamentally unfair as to invoke the Constitution."
Shirley v. North Carolina, 528 F.2d 819, 822 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing Ungar
v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)); see also United States v. LaRouche,
896 F.2d 815, 823 (4th Cir.) (defendant must show abuse of discretion and
actual prejudice), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990); United States v.
Poschwatta, 829 F.2d 1477, 1483 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1064 (1988) (district court did not abuse its discretion in denying continuance
requested to secure defense witness); United States v. Bourne, 743 F.2d
1026, 1031 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding ex parte hearing on motion to continue
not abuse of discretion); United States v. Sellers, 658 F.2d 230, 231 (4th
Cir. 1981) (upholding district court's denial of continuance where indict-
ments were amended seven days before trial); Miller v. State of North
Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 1978) ("Due process is not violated
unless the error constitutes a 'failure to observe that fundamental fairness
essential to the very concept of justice"' (citations omitted)).
15. Speedy Trial. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 provides for a maxi-
mum of seventy days between indictment and trial subject to specific delays
which toll the time period. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c), (h) (1988). The Act applies
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from the time a defendant is arrested under federal law. United States v.
Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1982). Neither a federal detainer nor
transport to federal court trigger application of the Act, unless there has
also been a federal arrest. United States v. Lee, 818 F.2d 302, 305 (4th Cir.
1987). The Act requires both a federal complaint and a federal arrest and/
or federal summons. Id. All time between the filing of a pre-trial motion
and the conclusion of hearing and briefing on the motion is excluded. 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1988); Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321
(1986); United States v. Shear, 825 F.2d 783 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1087 (1989); United States v. Velasquez, 802 F.2d 104, 105 (4th
Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Blackmon, 874 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 859, and cert. denied, 493 U.S. 862 (1989); United
States v. Thompson, 866 F.2d 268 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 828
(1989).
In computing the time within which trial must commence, the statute
excludes, inter alia, periods of time during which the defendant is undergoing
psychiatric examinations to determine competency to stand trial (§
3161(h)(1)(A)); is involved in a trial on other charges (§ 3161(h)(1)(D)); has
pretrial motions pending (§ 3161(h)(1)(F); is being moved from one correc-
tional facility to another (§ 3161(h)(1)(H); or has a trial continued by order
of the judge (§ 3161(h)(8)(A)).
Section 3161(h)(8)(A) allows the district court to exclude time from the
Speedy Trial calculus only if "the ends of justice served by [the exclusion]
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial." Section 3161(h)(8)(B) contains a nonexhaustive list of factors that
the district court shall consider in excluding time on the basis that it serves
the "ends of justice." The district court is required to consider all of these
factors, but need not make explicit findings on all four factors. See United
States v. Leiva, 959 F.2d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Cianciola,
920 F.2d 1295, 1300 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2830 (1991);
United States v. Quinteros, 769 F.2d 968, 974 (4th Cir. 1985).
The enumerated factors that the district court must consider in deter-
mining whether the ends of justice served by the exclusion of time outweigh
the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial are:
(i) whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the
proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such pro-
ceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.
(ii) whether the case is so unusual or complex, due to the
number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence
of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect
adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself
within the time limits established by this section.
(iii) whether, in a case in which arrest precedes indictment,
delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because the arrest
occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to expect return and
filing of the indictment within the period specified by § 3161(b), or
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because the facts upon which the grand jury must base its deter-
mination are unusual or complex.
(iv) whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case
which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall
within clause (ii), would deny the defendant reasonable time to
obtain counsel, would unreasonably delay the defendant or the
Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the
defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time
necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise
of due diligence.
No exclusion under this section can be granted because of the lack of
diligent preparation on the part of the government. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C)
(1988). However, the defendant must establish prejudice from the decision
to grant the exclusion to warrant relief on appeal. Leiva, 959 F.2d at 640;
Cianciola, 920 F.2d at 1298.
Review of the district court's decision to exclude time under §
3161(h)(8)(A) is under an abuse of discretion standard. Leiva, 959 F.2d at
640; United States v. Blandina, 895 F.2d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1989). Moreover,
unless the Speedy Trial violation is raised in the district court, it may not
be raised for the first time on appeal, United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182
(4th Cir. 1992), and a valid guilty plea also waives Speedy Trial violations,
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (valid guilty plea waives all
nonjurisdictional defects); United States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208 (9th Cir.
1992) (guilty plea waives Speedy Trial claim); accord United States v.
Lebowitz, 877 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1989).
16. Delay Until Indictment/Due Process Limits. Although the statute
of- limitations may not have run, whether a pre-accusation delay violates
the Due Process clause is determined on a case-by-case basis. Howell v.
Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 895 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 590 (1990);
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1977). Reversible error will
be found only when the delay violates "fundamental conceptions of justice
which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions' . . . and which
defy 'the community's sense of fair play and decency."' Lovasco, 431 U.S.
at 790 (citations omitted), and the defendant has suffered actual prejudice.
The burden of proving such prejudice is on the defendant. United States
v. Automated Medical Lab, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 403 (4th Cir. 1985).
17. Voir Dire/Right to Impartial Jury. The burden is on a defendant
to show that he was prejudiced by the conduct of voir dire. United States
v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987), and failure to make appropriate
objections during the voir dire process constitutes waiver. United States v.
LaRouche, 896 F.2d 815, 829 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 927 (1990);
King v. Jones, 824 F.2d 324, 326 (4th Cir. 1987). Where the issue is whether
specific questions should have been asked, the district court's determination
is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brooks, 957
F.2d 1138, 1144 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3051 (1992); United
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States v. Muldoon, 931 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Grandison, 783 F.2d 1152 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 845 (1986).
Particularly "wide discretion [is] granted to the trial court in conducting
voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity." Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct.
1899, 1906 (1991); see also United States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728, 733 (4th
Cir. 1991).
On a related point, the Supreme Court has recently affirmed that
"peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected fundamental
rights," but rather are "means to the constitutional end of an impartial
jury and a fair trial." Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2358 (1992);
see also United States v. Rucker, 557 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.4 (4th Cir. 1977)
("The right of peremptory challenge.., is conferred by Congress and the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and is not required by the Constitu-
tion"). This is directly related to voir dire in that "[t]he essential function
of voir dire is to allow for the impaneling of a fair and impartial jury
through questions which permit the intelligent exercise of challenges by
counsel." United States v. Brown, 799 F.2d 134, 135 (4th Cir. 1986) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2230
(1992) ("part of the guaranty of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is
an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors").
Because any rights regarding voir dire are subsumed under the larger
right to an impartial jury, voir dire issues should be considered in light of
relevant jury instructions. In general, a juror is presumed impartial and
jury instructions are presumed to be sufficient to allow a juror to lay aside
any impressions, opinions, or preconceptions and render an impartial verdict
based on the evidence. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Poynter v.
Ratcliff, 874 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1989).
In regard to refusal to ask specific voir dire questions followed by jury
instructions on the same points, see United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800,
807 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding failure to ask requested voire dire question
resulting in new trial); United States v. Robinson, 804 F.2d 280, 281 (4th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Carter, 772 F.2d 66, 67 (4th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Ledee, 549 F.2d 990, 992 (5th Cir.) (not error "to refuse to allow
inquiries of jurors as to whether they can accept certain propositions of
law"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977); United States v. Cosby, 529 F.2d
143, 149 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); United States v.
Clarke, 468 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Cowles, 503
F.2d 67, 68 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113 (1975); and United
States v. Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893, 898 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 969 (1973).
For further discussion of jury instructions, see supra paragraphs I.E.31
(Jury Instructions) and II.D.4.b (Joinder and Severance of Defendants/Jury
Instructions), and infra paragraph II.D.39 (Jury Instructions).
18. Suggestive Pretrial Identification Procedures. Convictions based on
eyewitness identification at trial, following pretrial identification by photo-
graph, will be set aside only if the pretrial photographic identification
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procedure "was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). "The exclusion of evidence from the jury
is, however, a drastic sanction, one that is limited to identification testimony
which is manifestly suspect." Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 443 (4th
Cir. 1986). Evidence that is not so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise
to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification is for the jury to
weigh because "evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is custom-
ary grist for the jury mill." Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977);
see also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972) (setting out five
factors to be considered in determining whether pretrial identification pro-
cedures are impermissibly suggestive); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967) (allowance of in-court
identification without "independent basis" of suggestive pretrial viewing of
single photo may be harmless beyond reasonable doubt where there is
otherwise overwhelming evidence of guilt).
19. Fifth Amendment/Nontestimonial Evidence. It is well-settled that
the Fifth Amendment "protects an accused only from being compelled to
testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a
testimonial or communicative nature." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 761 (1966) (footnote omitted). The privilege does not attach to "evi-
dence of acts noncommunicative in nature." Id. at 761 n.5. As the Supreme
Court has stated:
the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The
objection in principle would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and
compare his features with a photograph in proof.
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910); see United States v.
Maceo, 873 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 840 (1989) (upholding
marshal's examination of criminal defendant's teeth and gums while in
defendant's cell to validate detective's description of subject in custody).
For cases upholding a variety of orders requiring nontestimonial co-
operation, see Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (no Fifth Amend-
ment violation in court's order requiring handwriting exemplars); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (no error in ordering defendant to
appear in line-up and speak); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(upholding court's order of blood sample); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245 (1910) (no error in ordering defendant to put on certain piece of
clothing); United States v. Valenzuela, 722 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1983)
(no error in requiring defendant to shave his facial hair); United States v.
Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir.) (no error in ordering defendant to shave),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 854 (1978); United States v. Roberts, 481 F.2d 892
(5th Cir. 1973) (no error in ordering defendant to put on stocking mask);
FOR THE CRIMINAL PRACTITIONER
United States v. Hammond, 419 F.2d 166 (4th Cir. 1969) (no error in
ordering defendant to wear false goatee), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1068 (1970);
and United States v. Holland, 378 F. Supp. 144, 154-55 (E.D. Pa.) (no
error in ordering dental examination of defendant), affd, 506 F.2d 1050
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 994 (1975).
20. Prior Statements of Witnesses.
a. Prior Statements of Nontestifying Witness. In determining
whether a prior statement of a nontestifying witness should be
admitted, the Supreme Court has established a two-part test for
ascertaining whether the requirements of the Confrontation Clause
have been satisfied. First, the prosecution must either produce the
declarant at trial or show that the declarant is unavailable. But see
White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 741 (1992). See also United States
v. Ellis, 951 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3030
(1992). Second, the statement is admissible "only if it bears adequate
'indicia of reliability."' Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980);
accord Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990); Anderson v. United
States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974); United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d
1331, 1341 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346,
1354 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
Although the best practice is to caution the jury that the
testimony has not been subject to cross examination, if there is
otherwise overwhelming evidence of guilt the failure to do so may
be harmless error. United States v. Stockton, 788 F.2d 210 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 840 (1986); United States v. Murphy,
696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
b. Prior Statements of Testifying Witness. Rule 803(24) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(24) A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best
be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
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statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.
For cases interpreting Rule 803(24), see United States v. Renville, 779
F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir.
1978); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970); United States
v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 294 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945
(1983); United States v. Walker, 696 F.2d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
21. Promises in Plea Agreement to be Truthful. On the "propriety of
eliciting a plea bargain promise of truthfulness where ... the defense has
not indicated that it intends to use the plea bargain to attack the witness's
credibility," in United States v. Henderson the court found "no error in
permitting the government to elicit details of a plea agreement regardless
of the defense's intentions concerning its use for impeachment purposes."
717 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009 (1984). The
court explained:
[T]here is no evidence that the government derived any improper
advantage from [the witness'] testimony concerning his promise to
be truthful. The prosecutor's questions [did] not imply that the
government had special knowledge of the [co-defendant's] veracity.
The trial judge instructed the jury on the caution necessary in
evaluating testimony given pursuant to a plea bargain. Henderson
makes no claim that the prosecutor made improper use of the plea
bargain promise of truthfulness in closing argument. The promise
was not "disproportionately emphasized or repeated."
Id. at 138 (citation omitted).
22. Reference to Polygraph. Evidence that a witness has agreed to
take a polygraph (a.k.a. a lie detector) test is improper bolstering and
should be kept from the jury. United States v. Herrera, 832 F.2d 833, 835
(4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 974 (4th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988). However, the error may be deemed
harmless, particularly where there is substantial other evidence and/or a
cautionary instruction is given or offered. Porter, 821 F.2d at 974; United
States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1444-45 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 938 (1987); United States v. Smith, 565 F.2d 292, 294-95 (4th Cir.1977).
23. Evidence of Threats. Evidence of threats by a defendant to a
potential Government witness is admissible on the issue of guilt. United
States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 329-30 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 820 (1983).
24. Lost Evidence. In the absence of bad faith or an impaired ability
to put on a meaningful defense, the inadvertent loss of evidence is not
reversible error. United States v. Sanders, 954 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1992)
(inadvertent erasure of bank videotape not denial of due process); accord
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Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); United States v. Solomon,
686 F.2d 863, 872 (1lth Cir. 1982).
25. Chain of Custody. The court is perhaps less willing than it once
was to exclude evidence on technical chain of custody grounds. Rather, the
question is a more substantive one: whether the Government has sufficiently
established that the evidence is, in fact, what it purports to be. See, e.g.,
United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 365-66 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 874 (1982).
26. Clergy-Communicant Privilege. The clergy-communicant, or priest-
penitent, privilege only covers communications designed to elicit spiritual
advice or consolation. Other communications with a priest, pastor, or
spiritual advisor are not covered by the privilege. Trammell v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 384
(3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1987).
27. Rule 403. Although Rule 403 is considered most often in conjunc-
tion with potential Rule 404(b) evidence, Rule 403 by its own terms requires
exclusion of any evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. Appraisal of the probative and prejudicial value of
evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court and its
appraisal, absent extraordinary circumstances, will not be disturbed on
appeal. United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir. 1990). Such
an abuse of discretion will only be found when the trial court acted
"arbitrarily" or "irrationally" in admitting evidence. Garraghty v. Jordan,
830 F.2d 1295, 1298 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d
49, 53 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 88 (4th Cir.
1980). See also Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 853 F.2d
1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. King, 768 F.2d 586, 588 (4th
Cir. 1985) (Rule 404(b) evidence regarding convictions for distributing
different illegal drugs from one with which defendant was then charged not
unduly prejudicial per Rule 403). Finally, in considering Rule 403 challenges,
due consideration should be given to the curative power of any relevant
jury instructions. United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214, 219 (4th Cir.
1982); Masters, 622 F.2d at 87.
For further discussion of Rule 403, see supra paragraph I.E.19 and
infra paragraph II.D.28.d.
28. Rule 404(b) Evidence. Rule 404(b) evidence continues to occasion
a great deal of appellate ink. The principles of law to which the court
repeatedly returns are familiar ones:
a. Generally. Rule 404(b) permits evidence of a defendant's prior
crimes, wrongs, or other "bad acts" to prove "motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident," but only if such evidence is (1) relevant to an issue
other than character; (2) necessary; and (3) reliable. FED. R. Evm.
404(B); United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d 444, 447 (4th Cir. 1991);
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United States v. Rawle, 845 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1986).
b. Standard of Review on Appeal. The district court's admission
of Rule 404(b) evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Mark,
943 F.2d at 447; United States v. Fells, 920 F.2d 1179, 1181 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2831 (1991); United States v.
Ramsey, 791 F.2d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 1986). Indeed, the district
court's discretion will not be disturbed unless its exercise was
"arbitrary or irrational." United States v. Haney, 914 F.2d 602,
607 (4th Cir. 1990); Rawle, 845 F.2d at 1247; Greenwood, 796 F.2d
at 53; United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 85-86 (4th Cir. 1980).
c. Almost Infinite Reasons. Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion
rather than exclusion. Thus, the reasons which justify 404(b) evi-
dence are not limited to those listed in the Rule, but as one opinion
put it, are almost "infinite" in number. United States v. Watford,
894 F.2d 665, 671 (4th Cir. 1990); Masters, 622 F.2d at 86.
d. Rule 403 Prejudice. Even if evidence is admissible under Rule
404(b), however, it may be excluded per Rule 403 if "the risk that
the jury will be excited to irrational behavior is disproportionate to
the probative value of the evidence." United States v. Tedder, 801
F.2d 1437, 1444 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 938 (1987);
see United States v. Percy; 765 F.2d 1199, 1204 (4th Cir. 1985)
(upholding admission of evidence where its probative value out-
weighed potential to invoke irrational or emotional behavior by
jurors). However, while a specific finding of probative value out-
weighing prejudice to the defendant may aid the appellate court,
such an explicit finding is neither required nor necessary. Rawle,
845 F.2d at 1247. For further discussion of Rule 403, see supra
paragraphs I.E.19 and II.D.27.
e. Post-Indictment Conduct. Post-indictment conduct may also be
admissible under Rule 404(b), if it otherwise meets the requirements
set forth above. Ramey, 791 F.2d at 323; United States v. Hines,
717 F.2d 1481, 1489 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1214
(1984); Hadaway, 681 F.2d at 217-18.
f. Acquitted Conduct. Defendant's prior acquittal does not pre-
clude admission as Rule 404(b) evidence in a subsequent trial if it
otherwise meets the requirements for admissibility. Dowling v. United
States, 493 U.S. 342, 348 (1990).
g. Importance of Limiting Instructions. Any undue prejudice to
the defendant caused by the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence can
be substantially limited by an appropriate jury instruction. Hada-
way, 681 F.2d at 219; Rawle, 845 F.2d at 1248; Masters, 622 F.2d
at 87.
For further discussion of Rule 404(b), see supra paragraph I.E.20.
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29. Cross-Examination. A trial court may impose reasonable limits on
cross-examination to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation.
See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974); United States v. Bodden,
736 F.2d 142, 145 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Atkinson, 512 F.2d
1235, 1238 (4th Cir. 1975). Whether and how to limit cross-examination is
within the trial court's discretion. United States v. Crockett, 813 F.2d 1310,
1312 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 834 (1987); see also Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) ("[Trial judges retain wide latitude
insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits
on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about ... confusion of the
issues ... or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant").
30. Expert Testimony. A trial judge has broad discretion to exclude
expert testimony under FED. R. Evm. 702 if it is determined that a proposed
expert will not significantly assist the trier of fact. See EI-Meswari v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 785 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1986). The trial
court's admission or rejection of expert testimony is reviewed on appeal for
abuse of discretion. See Persinger v. Norfolk, & Western Ry. Co., 920 F.2d
1185, 1187 (4th Cir. 1990).
31. Harmless Error. Assuming admission of certain evidence or some
other aspect of proceedings in the trial court was error, the appellate court
must determine whether the error was harmless or reversible. Whether a
particular error is found to be harmless turns on "the closeness of the case,
the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to
mitigate the effects of the error." United States v. Nyman, 649 F.2d 208,
212 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079
(D.C. Cir. 1969)). "[IThe appropriate test of harmlessness ... is whether
[it can be said] 'with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment
was not substantially swayed by the error." Nyman, 649 F.2d at 211-12
(4th Cir. 1980) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765
(1946)). Only if "it [is] highly probable that the error did not affect the
judgment" should an error be found harmless. Nyman, 649 F.2d at 212
(internal quotation omitted); see United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1193
(4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 955 (1991); United States v. Urbanik,
801 F.2d 692, 698 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Johnson, 610 F.2d 194,
196 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 911 (1980); United States v.
Curry, 512 F.2d 1299 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975).
32. Misprision of a Felony. To establish the crime of misprision of a
felony, the government must prove: (1) a felony was committed; (2) the
defendant knew that the felony had been committed; (3) the defendant
failed to notify authorities; and (4) the defendant took an affirmative step
to conceal the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1988); United States v. Baez, 732 F.2d
780, 782 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Ciambrone, 750 F.2d 1416, 1417
(9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Stuard, 566 F.2d 1, 2 (6th Cir. 1977); Neal
v. United States, 102 F.2d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 1939). Circuits that have
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spoken to the issue have generally agreed that something more than silence
or failure to report a known crime must be shown to prove the requisite
concealment. See, e.g., United States v. Warters, 885 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Jennings, 603 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1979); United
States v. King, 402 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1968); Lancey v. United States, 356
F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 922 (1966); Bratton v. United
States, 73 F.2d 795, 797-98 (10th Cir. 1934). However, the extent to which
a defendant must go beyond silence to "conceal" is not great. See United
States v. Pittman, 527 F.2d 444 (4th Cir. 1975) (defendant's lying to
investigator regarding her husband's involvement in bank robbery is suffi-
cient to show "concealment"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976); Lancey,
356 F.2d at 410-11 (harboring fugitive or hiding evidence can constitute
"concealment"); Bratton, 73 F.2d at 797-98 (10th Cir. 1934) (dicta) (sup-
pression of evidence or harboring criminal would be concealment); see also
United States v. Gravitt, 590 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1979) (transporting robbers
to retrieve loot is sufficient proof of concealment).
33. Mailing Threats. In a prosecution for mailing threats under 18
U.S.C. § 876, "intent [to threaten] can be gleaned from the very nature of
the words used in the communication; extrinsic evidence to prove an intent
to threaten should only be necessary when the threatening nature of the
communication is ambiguous." United States v. Maxton, 940 F.2d 103, 106
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 398 (1991). However, there is no
requirement that the government prove a defendant actually intended to
carry out his threats. United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360-61
(4th Cir. 1978).
34. Attempt to Commit Crime. The elements of an attempt are (1) an
intent to commit a crime and (2) an overt act, or "substantial step," toward
its commission which corroborates the intent. United States v. Pelton, 835
F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010 (1988).
35. Conspiracies.
a. Single Versus Multiple Conspiracies. Whether the Government
has proven a single conspiracy, versus multiple conspiracies-a fact
which may have momentous consequences for a defendant-is a
jury question. United States v. Leavis, 853 F.2d 215, 218 (4th Cir.
1988); United States v. Urbanik, 801 F.2d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Burman, 584 F.2d 1354, 1356 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1118 (1979). Whether there is one conspiracy or
more depends on the overlap of main actors, methods, and goals,
and whether there is one overall agreement. See United States v.
Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1474 (1992); Leavis, 853 F.2d at 218; United States v. Ragins, 840
F.2d 1184, 1189-92 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Crockett, 813
F.2d 1310, 1316-17 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 834 (1987).
On appeal the evidence must be reviewed in the light most favorable
to the Government. Barsanti, 943 F.2d at 439; Urbanik, 801 F.2d
at 695.
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b. Presumed to Continue Until Withdrawal. Once a defendant is
shown to be involved in a conspiracy he is presumed to continue
in the conspiracy until he takes "affirmative action" to withdraw,
that is, until he acts "to defeat or disavow the purposes of the
conspiracy." United States v. Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 844 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 432 (1990); Leavis, 853 F.2d at 218; United
States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
869 (1989).
The burden of proving withdrawal from the conspiracy is on
the defendant. United States v. Walker, 796 F.2d 43, 49 (4th Cir.
1986). Finally, whether and when a defendant withdrew from a
particular conspiracy are factual findings which will be affirmed on
appeal unless clearly erroneous. Barsanti, 943 F.2d at 437; United
States v. Grubb, 527 F.2d 1107, 1109 (4th Cir. 1975).
c. Statements of Co-Conspirators. Before admitting evidence as a
co-conspirator's statement, the trial court must first conclude: (1)
that there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the party
against whom admission of the evidence is sought; and (2) that the
statements at issue were made in furtherance and in the course of
that conspiracy. See United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1255
(4th Cir. 1992) (citing Bour/aily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175
(1987)). These threshold requirements must be established by a
preponderance of the evidence including circumstantial evidence.
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175; Leavis, 853 F.2d at 219-20; United
States v. Massuet, 851 F.2d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th Cir. 1976). Any findings of fact
with respect to these questions are subject to a clearly erroneous
standard of review, and a district court's decision to admit evidence
under Rule 801(d) (2) (E) may only be overturned on appeal if it
constituted an abuse of discretion." Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181;
Blevins, 960 F.2d at 1255 (citations omitted).
d. Pinkerton Liability. In a conspiracy, under the general rule
established by the Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640, 645 (1946), "a conspirator may be convicted of
substantive offenses committed by co-conspirators in the course of
and in furtherance of the conspiracy. .. ." United States v. Chor-
man, 910 F.2d 102, 111 (4th Cir. 1990); see United States v.
Cummings, 937 F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
395 (1991). In order for the Pinkerton Rule imposing liability for
the substantive crimes of other co-conspirators to apply, it must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the substantive offense
was committed by one of the members of the conspiracy, (2) while
the one committing the crime was a member of the conspiracy, (3)
in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) that the substantive crime
was a reasonably foreseeable part of the conspiracy. Chorman, 910
F.2d at 111.
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36. Sufficiency of the Evidence/Credibility of Witnesses.
a. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence is
likely to be challenged, both at the Rule 29 stage and after a verdict
of guilty is returned. In either event, the test for whether a verdict
is supported by sufficient evidence is "whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979) (emphasis in original). See also Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). For recent examples of the long line of
Fourth Circuit cases applying this familiar test, see United States
v. Fisher, 912 F.2d 728, 730 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2019 (1991); United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1193 (4th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168, 1173 (4th Cir.
1989) (circumstantial evidence need not exclude every hypothesis of
innocence); United States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135, 1151 (4th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Stockton, 788 F.2d 210, 218 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 840 (1986); United States v. Jones, 735 F.2d
785, 790 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984); United States
v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 790 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v.
MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982) (appellate court "must
consider circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and allow the
government the benefit of all reasonable inferences"); United States
v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1014 (1980). Indeed, even the uncorroborated testimony of a
single witness may be sufficient. United States v. Arrington, 719
F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1028 (1984);
see United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 392 (4th Cir. 1984)
(". . . uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may be sufficient
to sustain a conviction"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985).
b. Credibility of Witnesses for Jury. In determining the sufficiency
of evidence, the credibility of witnesses is strictly a matter for the
jury. United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Cecil, 836 F.2d 1431, 1441 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1205 (1988); Pigford v. United States, 518 F.2d 831, 836
(4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Fisher, 484 F.2d 868, 869-70 (4th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 924 (1974); United States v.
Shipp, 409 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 864 (1969).
37. Informing Jury Regarding Penalties. A defendant is not entitled
to have the jury told about the severity of sentence he faces if convicted;
in fact, the jury is not to be instructed as to penalties. United States v.
Meredith, 824 F.2d 1418, 1429 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969 (1987);
United States v. Goodface, 835 F.2d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1384 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Davidson, 367 F.2d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1966).
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38. Jury Conduct.
a. Jury Notes. The decision to allow the jury to take notes for
use during deliberations is within the discretion of the trial court,
and absent an abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.
United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Oppon, 863 F.2d 141, 148 (1st Cir. 1988). Where
jurors are permitted to take notes, they should be instructed that
their notes are not evidence and should not take precedence over
the juror's independent recollection of the evidence. However, the
failure to so instruct may be harmless'error, particularly where no
such instruction was requested by the defendant. Polowichak, 785
F.2d at 413.
b. Independent Investigation/Prejudicial Evidence Generally/Less
Than Twelve Jurors. In United States v. Seeright, 978 F.2d 842,
849-50 (4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld dismissing a juror who had
conducted "an independent investigation" of certain evidence and
proceeding with the case with eleven jurors. The court cited United
States v. Barnes, 747 F.2d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1984) (district court
must evaluate whether there is "reasonable possibility that the jury's
verdict was influenced by the material that improperly came before
it") (quoting Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d 194, 195 (5th
Cir. 1980)); and United States v. Fisher, 912 F.2d 728, 733 (4th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2019 (1991) ("quite clearly the
occasional use of a jury of slightly less than 12 ... is constitu-
tional," in a case involving dismissal of a juror for cause after jury
deliberations began) (quoting Advisory Committee to the Federal
Rules). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
39. Jury Instructions.
a. Taken as a Whole. When considering a challenge to jury
instructions, the inquiry on appeal is limited to "whether, taken as
a whole, the instruction fairly states the controlling law." United
States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788-89 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 758 (1991); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,
146-47 (1973) (particular jury instruction "may not be judged in
artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall
charge").
b. Jury Presumed to be Able to Follow. "The jury is generally
presumed to be able to follow an instruction to disregard evidence,
absent some strong indication that the evidence is so powerful that
a jury could not ignore it and that the defendant would be harmed
as a result." United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 112 L. Ed. 675 (1991); see also Yates v. Evatt,
.111 S. Ct. 1884, 1893 (1991) (discussing "sound presumption of
appellate practice, that jurors are reasonable and generally follow
the instructions they are given").
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c. Standard of Review on Appeal. Both the decision whether to
give and the contents of any jury instruction are reviewed on appeal
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lozano, 839 F.2d 1020,
1024 (4th Cir. 1988); Nelson v. Green Ford, Inc., 788 F.2d 205,
208-09 (4th Cir. 1986). However, if the defendant fails to object,
he must show plain error to warrant reversal. FED. R. CRM. P.
52(b); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1060 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986); United States v. Venneri, 736
F.2d 995, 996-97 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984). As
the Supreme Court has stated, "[i]t is the rare case in which an
improper jury instruction will justify reversal of a criminal convic-
tion when no objection has been made in the trial court." Henderson
v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1976).
d. Cross References. For further discussion of jury instructions,
see infra paragraph I.E. 31 (Jury Instructions) and supra paragraphs
II.D.4.b (Joinder and Severance of Defendants/Jury Instructions)
and II.D.17 (Voir Dire).
40. Inconsistent Verdicts. Inconsistent verdicts do not invalidate a co-
defendant's conviction. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984);
United States v. Harriott, 976 F.2d 198, 202 (4th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir. 1990) (acquittal of sole co-conspirator
does not require reversal of defendant's conviction); United States v. Ar-
rington, 719 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1028
(1984); United States v. Harris, 701 F.2d 1095, 1103 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1214 (1983).
41. Notice of Appeal. Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure requires a notice of appeal to be filed within ten days of
judgment. The district court may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal for thirty days upon a showing of excusable neglect with or without
a motion being filed. The district court may not otherwise extend the time
for filing a notice of appeal. See United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351,
353-54 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 857 (1985); United States v.
Schuchardt, 685 F.2d 901, 902 (4th Cir. 1982).
A letter or other document filed by an incarcerated prisoner can be a
valid notice of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 3 if it (1) notifies the court
that an appeal is being taken and (2) notifies the party-opposite. Smith v.
Barry, 112 S. Ct. 678, 682 (1992); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438, 443 n.5 (1962). Under Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988), the
notice of appeal is considered filed when it is given to prison officials for
mailing.
42. Guilty Pleas/Rule 11 Proceedings. A defendant who pleads guilty
may not challenge deprivations of his constitutional rights that occurred
prior to the plea, but rather may only challenge the voluntary and counselled
nature of the plea itself. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)
(guilty plea forecloses any challenge to nonjurisdictional errors, except in
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limited situations); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); United
States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1992) (guilty plea waives Speedy
Trial claim); accord Lebowitz v. United States, 877 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1989);
Johnson v. Puckett, 930 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1991) (guilty plea waives attack
on constitutionality of prior convictions supporting defendant's enhanced
sentence as habitual offender), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 252 (1992); Mack
v. United States, 853 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1988); Hayle v. United States, 815
F.2d 879 (2d Cir. 1987).
Where a defendant is represented by counsel during the Rule 11 pro-
ceeding, the voluntariness of the plea turns on whether the defendant
received constitutionally adequate "effective assistance of counsel." Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). On this subject, see paragraph II.D.52,
infra. Statements made by the defendant regarding the voluntariness of a
plea and assistance of counsel constitute strong evidence of voluntariness
and are "a formidable barrier" to its subsequent attack. Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); Fields v. Attorney General, 956 F.2d
1290, 1297 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 243 (1992); United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1703 (1992);
United States v. Reckmeyer, 786 F.2d 1216, 1221 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 850 (1986) (precise manner in which Rule 11 proceedings are
conducted is left to sound discretion of district court); Via v. Superintendent,
Powhatan Correctional Center, 643 F.2d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 1981).
43. Threat to Indict. The Government's threat to indict a defendant
on additional or more serious charges if he does not plead guilty is not a
proper basis for challenging a guilty plea. The courts have long recognized
that it is the avoidance or dismissal of such charges that fuels the plea
bargain process and makes it work. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357, 363-64 (1978).
44. Sufficiency of Indictment. Appellate claims regarding the vagueness
or sufficiency of the indictment are seldom successful, particularly when
made for the first time on appeal. In such a rare case, reversal would
depend upon a finding of "plain error." FED. R. Cium. P. 12(b)(2); United
States v. Hallock, 941 F.2d 36, 39 n.2 (1st Cir. 1991); cf. United States v.
Fogel, 901 F.2d 23, 25 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 343 (1990)
("Because the appellant's objection to this indictment was made after the
jury rendered its verdict, any review for alleged defect is to be reviewed, if
at all, under a liberal standard and 'every intendment is . . . indulged in
support of the sufficiency."' (citation omitted)); Finn v. United States, 256
F.2d 304, 307 (4th Cir. 1958) ("[i]ndictments ... are construed more
liberally ... and every indictment is then indulged in support of the
sufficiency" when first challenged on appeal).
"The indictment must charge all the essential elements of a criminal
offense and sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared
to meet so he will not be misled while preparing his defense, and it must
protect the defendant against later prosecution for the same offense." United
States v. Hayes, 775 F.2d 1279, 1282 (4th Cir. 1985); see Fogel, 901 F.2d
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at 25 ("An indictment that tracks the statutory language is ordinarily
valid").
Similarly, claims that there was a variance between the charge in a Bill
of Indictment and the Government's proof have a difficult burden to bear.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a]ny
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded." As the Supreme Court observed in Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935):
The true inquiry ... is not whether there has been a variance of
proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to 'affect the
substantial rights' of the accused. The general rule that allegations
and proof must correspond is based upon the obvious requirements
(1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges
against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and
not be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and
(2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the
same offense.
Id. at 82 (citations omitted). On prejudicial variance generally, see United
States v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 118 (4th Cir. 1984); and United States v. DeBrouse,
652 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir. 1981).
For further discussion of sufficiency of an indictment, see supra para-
graph I.E.4.
45. Improper Prosecutorial Comment or Conduct. In United States v.
Harrison, the Fourth Circuit identified the following four factors as central
to determining whether improper prosecutorial comment is so damaging as
to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have
a tendency to mislead the jury and prejudice the accused; (2) whether the
remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of
competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4)
whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert
attention to extraneous matters. 716 F.2d 1050, 1052 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 972 (1984).
Although a prosecutor may not comment, either directly or indirectly,
on a defendant's failure to testify, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965), comment on the failure of the defense is acceptable. United States
v. Borchardt, 809 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987).
The test for determining whether an indirect remark con-
stitutes improper comment on a defendant's failure to testify
is: "Was the language used manifestly intended to be, or
was it of such character that the jury would naturally and
necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the
accused to testify."
United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 1980) (quoting
United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 701 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417
U.S. 211 (1974).
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In order to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct based upon presen-
tation of false testimony, a defendant must show that the prosecutor knew
the testimony was false. United States v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967, 971 (4th
Cir. 1987).
Assuming a prosecutor's comments or conduct is found to be improper,
the question arises whether the error has rendered the trial so fundamentally
unfair as to deny the defendant due process and therefore constitutes
reversible error. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986); Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). Thus, for example, the court in
Harrison found the prosecutorial comments at issue to be improper but
harmless error. See United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 842 (1988). In deciding whether improper prosecutorial
comments constitute harmless or reversible error, "absent other indications
of prejudice or evidence of intentional prosecutorial misconduct," an in-
struction by the court will normally cure any unfairness to a defendant.
United States v. Moore, 710 F.2d 157, 159 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 862 (1983); see also United States v. Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1298 (4th
Cir.) (jury instruction to ignore prosecutor's indirect comment on defen-
dant's failure to testify cured any conceivable improper impression created
by comment), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1107 (1985).
46. Judicial Bias/Recusal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) a judge should
recuse himself or herself if a reasonable person with knowledge of all the
facts of the case, might question the judge's impartiality. Liljeberg v. Health
Services Acquisitions Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988); United States v.
Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1989). Denial of a recusal motion is
reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. Mitchell, 886 F.2d at 671;
United States v. Carmichael, 726 F.2d 158, 160 (4th Cir. 1984). However,
if raised for the first time on appeal, a claim of judicial bias is reviewed
under the stricter plain error standard of FED. R. Clum. P. 52(b). See
United States v. Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534, 535-36 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 843 (1979).
The subjective mindset of the judge is irrelevant to a determination of
impartiality under section 455(a). In addition, "'[tihe alleged bias must
derive from an extra-judicial source. It must result in an opinion on the
merits on a basis other than that learned by the judge from his participation
in the matter."' Mitchell, 886 F.2d at 671 (quoting In re Beard, 811 F.2d
818, 827 (4th Cir. 1987)); accord Shaw v. Martin, 733 F.2d 304, 308-09
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); United States v. Carmichael,
726 F.2d 158, 160 (4th Cir. 1984); cf. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (refusing to disqualify judge under 28 U.S.C. § 144
(1988) for evidence-based bias). 2 If the judge's perceived bias is based solely
2. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Circuits are split on this issue. Waller
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2321 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adhere to the view that the source of the
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on evidence from the case before him or her, such will not serve to disqualify
the judge.
A defendant's assertion of judicial bias frequently stems from questions
interjected to witnesses by the presiding judge. However, it is well established
that a federal judge has the authority to comment on evidence, question
witnesses, and even call witnesses. See FED. R. EvID. 614(b); United States
v. Seeright, 978 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Norris, 749 F.2d
1116, 1123 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U. S. 1065 (1985); Crandell v.
United States, 703 F.2d 74, 78 (4th Cir. 1983). Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit
explained in United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 775 (4th Cir. 1983),
quoting Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1941)), "[the
trial court] should not hesitate to ask questions for the purpose of developing
the facts.... [H]e has no more important duty than to see that the facts
are properly developed and that their bearing upon the question at issue
are clearly understood by the jury." See also United States v. Hickman,
592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir. 1979) (trial court must "see that the issues are
not obscured and that the testimony is not misunderstood" and "has the
right to interrogate witnesses for this purpose"); United States v. Cassiagnol,
420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir. 1970) (same), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044
(1970). As the Parodi court noted:
In order to determine whether the district judge so abused his
proper prerogatives in this regard that a fair trial was denied [the
defendant], it is necessary to look not merely at the challenged
questions in isolation but also at the demeanor and conduct of the
trial judge throughout the trial, to search the record for evidence
of partiality or bias that might indicate a belief on the judge's part
that [the defendant was] "guilty" or suggest that [the judge] had
usurped the function of prosecutor.
Parodi, 703 F.2d at 776.
47. Waiver of Appeal by Failure to Object/Evidence Not in Record.
Failure to object to testimony or other evidence at the time it is offered at
trial will in all likelihood preclude consideration of the objection on appeal.
United States v. Maxton, 940 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 398 (1991); United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 783 (4th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Anderson, 481 F.2d 685, 694-95 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 417
U.S. 211 (1974); see also United States v. Terry, 729 F.2d 1063, 1069 (6th
alleged bias must be extrajudicial. In contrast, the First Circuit has consistently held that a
judge may be disqualified pursuant to § 455(a) for alleged bias originating from evidence in
the judicial proceeding. Compare Mitchell, 886 F.2d at 671 (stating that bias must be extra-
judicial); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 960 (5th Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 946 (1987); United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 599 (6th.Cir. 1990) (same); United
States v. Monaco, 852 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1040
(1989) and McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990) (same) with
United States v. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018, 1022 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that judge may be
disqualified for case-based bias).
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Cir. 1984); United States v. Edgewood Health Care Ctr., Inc., 608 F.2d
13, 14 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980); DiPaola v. Riddle,
581 F.2d 1111, 1113 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
Likewise, a defendant's failure to object at sentencing waives the issue
on appeal in the absence of plain error. United States v. Tibesar, 894 F.2d
317, 319 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 79 (1990); United States v.
Daiagi, 892 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. 1989); Wren v. United States, 540 F.2d
643, 644 n.1 (4th Cir. 1975); FED. R. Cm. P. 52(b).
Similarly, a defendant is precluded from raising a claim on direct appeal
relating to evidence that is not a part of the record below. United States
v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098, 1112 (4th Cir. 1992) (post card purporting to be
from murder victim which defendant did not receive until after sentencing
not part of record on appeal, and therefore would have to be raised through
Rule 33 motion or 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) petition), cert. denied, 61
U.S.L.W. 3479 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1993); United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378
(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 548 (9th
Cir. 1989); Virgin Islands v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 1986).
For further discussion of waiver of appellate review by failure to object,
see supra paragraphs II.D.12.e., II.D.13, and II.D. 39.c.
48. Rule 32 Violations. Findings under Rule 32(c) (3) (D) need not be
made with minute specificity. See United States v. Perrera, 842 F.2d 73
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 837 (1988). Although the rule requires
that a written record of such finding be appended to any copy of the
presentence report made available to the Bureau of Prisons or Parole
Commission, United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488 (4th Cir. 1989), ordi-
narily, a written transcript of the sentencing hearing complies with Rule
32(c)(3)(D). See United States v. Hill, 766 F.2d 856, 858 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 923 (1985). To prevail in a Rule 32 claim, a defendant
has the burden to show that the disputed information was "materially
inaccurate and that the judge relied on the information." United States v.
Tooker, 747 F.2d 975, 978 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1021
(1985). Finally, Rule 32 claims not raised on direct appeal will be deemed
waived unless the error is so egregious as to be deemed a violation of due
process. United States v. Emanuel, 869 F.2d 795, 796 (4th Cir. 1989); see
United States v. Roberson, 896 F.2d 388, 391 (9th Cir.), amended on reh'g,
917 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1990).
For further discussion of factual findings by the district court generally,
see supra paragraph II.D.12.
49. Rule 33 (Motion For New Trial). The standard for considering a
Rule 33 motion depends upon how soon following trial the motion is made.
If made within seven days, an "interest of justice" standard applies. United
States v. Mitchell, 602 F.2d 636, 639 (4th Cir. 1979); see 3 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 557, at 316 (2d ed. 1982).
If a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is made after
that time (but before two years elapse), the five-part test set forth in United
States v. Chavis, 880 F.2d 788, 793 (4th Cir. 1989) is applied:
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1. Is the evidence, in fact, newly discovered?
2. Are facts alleged from which the court may infer due diligence
on the part of the movant?
3. Is the evidence relied upon not merely cumulative or impeach-
ing?
4. Is the evidence material to the issues involved?
5. Would the evidence probably result in acquittal at a new trial?
Under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a district
court, despite the pendency of an appeal, has jurisdiction to entertain a
motion for a new trial. The court may either deny the motion or certify to
the court of appeals its intention to grant the motion, so that the Court of
Appeals could, if it wished, entertain a motion to remand the case. See
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 667 n.42 (1984).
Denial of a Rule 33 motion for new trial will be affirmed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Sloan v. Colebank, 304
F.2d 668 (4th Cir. 1962). In general, motions for a new trial are not favored
and should be sparingly granted. 3 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 557 (2d ed. 1982).
For further discussion of Rule 33, see supra paragraph I.E.33.
50. Petition for Certiorari. If a defendant wishes to petition the
Supreme Court for certiorari, a court-appointed lawyer must represent him
in filing the petition. Wilkins v. United States, 441 U.S. 468, 469 (1979);
Proffitt v. United States, 549 F.2d 910, 912 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1076 (1977). Also, see the Fourth Circuit's Internal Operating
Procedure ("I.O.P.") 46.3 and Plan in Implementation of the Criminal
Justice Act of 1964 ("Plan") which require court-appointed counsel to
inform clients in writing of the right to petition for certiorari and to file a
petition if so requested. Plan, Part V, § 2. The remedy for a breach of
this duty is re-entry of the judgment on appeal to permit the defendant,
with the assistance of counsel, to file a timely petition for certiorari. Wilkins,
441 U.S. at 470.
51. Rule 35 Motions. The district court's disposition of a Rule 35
motion will not be disturbed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion.
United States v. Stumpf, 476 F.2d 945, 946 (4th Cir. 1973); cf. United
States v. Guglielmi, 929 F.2d 1001, 1002-07 (4th Cir. 1991) (district court's
resolute refusal to reduce 25-year sentence for obscenity offenses held failure
"to exercise its discretion discernably or meaningfully").
A defendant has ten days to appeal final disposition of a Rule 35
motion, although an untimely attempt to appeal raising an issue which
could be raised under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) will be deemed to be a
petition for relief under that statute. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,
430 (1962); United States v. Santora, 711 F.2d 41, 42 (5th Cir. 1983).
However, unless the issue is one cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988),
the court loses authority to reconsider or modify its decision at the end of
the ten day appeal period. United States v. Breit, 754 F.2d 526, 630 (4th
Cir. 1985).
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52. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
a. In 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Proceedings/Not on Direct Appeal. Claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel should be raised in a 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 petition rather than on direct appeal unless the record
conclusively shows ineffective assistance. United States v. Hanley,
974 F.2d 14, 16 n.2 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Underwood,
970 F.2d 1336, 1340 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Grandison,
783 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 845 (1986);
United States v. Percy, 765 F.2d 1199, 1205 (4th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 78 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1005, and 457 U.S. 1136, and 459 U.S. 843 (1982); United
States v. Fisher, 477 F.2d 300, 302 (4th Cir. 1973).
b. Standard on Appeal. The Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), adopted a two-pronged test for
determining in retrospect whether assistance of counsel has been
constitutionally adequate. The first prong relates to professional
competence. Here, the defendant must show that counsel's repre-
sentation was deficient to the extent that representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-91. In this
regard, the Supreme Court made it clear in Strickland that there is
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689; see Fields
v. Attorney Gen. of Md., 956 F.2d 1290, 1297-99 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 243 (1992); Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463,
1476 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,- 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Hutchins
v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1430-31 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1065 (1984); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
The second prong of the Strickland v. Washington test is that
"[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The two prongs of the Strickland test
are sometimes referred to as the "performance" and "prejudice"
components. Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297.
It is important to note that "It]he defendant bears the burden
of proving Strickland prejudice," Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297 (citing
Hutchins, 724 F.2d at 1430-31), and that absent the defendant
meeting this burden "a reviewing court need not consider the
performance prong." Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297 (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697). Moreover, in regard to the degree of prejudice a
defendant must show, as this Court stated in Hooper v. Garraghty,
845 F.2d 471, 475 (4th Cir.) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 59 (1985)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 843 (1988):
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When a defendant challenges a conviction entered after a guilty
plea, [the] "prejudice" prong of the [Strickland] test is Slightly
modified. Such a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Accord Craker v. McCotter, 805 F.2d 538, 542 (5th Cir. 1986)
(allegation that effective counsel would have negotiated better plea
bargain insufficient to establish prejudice under Hill), cited with
approval in Fields, 956 F.2d at 1297.
c. Conflict of Interest. The appellate courts appear to give some-
what closer scrutiny to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
based upon alleged conflicts of interest, than they do to more
generalized questioning of an attorney's handling of a particular
case. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d
370 (4th Cir. 1991); Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.
1990); United States v. Akinseye, 802 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1987); United States v. Arias, 678 F.2d
1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 910 (1982); United States v.
Ramsey, 661 F.2d 1013 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005
(1982). For further discussion of conflicts of interest as ineffective
assistance of counsel, see supra paragraph I.E.38.
d. Failure to Perfect Appeal. Failure to file notice and otherwise
perfect an appeal may be a prima facie case of ineffective assistance
of counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985)
(attorney's failure to perfect appeal after trial deprived petitioner
of constitutionally guaranteed effective assistance of counsel); Abels
v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821, 823 (10th Cir. 1990); Estes v. United States,
883 F.2d 645, 648-49 (8th Cir. 1989); Doyle v. United States, 721
F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1983). But cf. Barrientos v. United States,
668 F.2d 838, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1982).
e. Cross References. For further discussion of ineffective assistance
of counsel, see supra paragraphs I.E. 38 and 39.
53. Other 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Proceedings.
a. Challenges to Computation of Sentence. Challenges to the com-
putation of a sentence must be brought in the district of confine-
ment, United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1989),
and then only after an initial determination has been made by the
Attorney General. United States v. Wilson, 112 S. Ct. 1351 (1992).
b. Evidentiary Hearings. No evidentiary hearing is necessary on a
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) petition if there are no genuine disputes
as to material facts, including any petition regarding which the
record conclusively shows that a petitioner is entitled to no relief.
Aleman v. United States, 878 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1989).
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However, when there are genuine disputes as to material facts, an
evidentiary hearing should be held. United States v. Young, 644
F.2d 1008, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981); Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458
(4th Cir. 1979). Also, see the discussion of this point in supra
paragraph I.E.39.b.
c. Successive § 2255 Petitions as "Abuse of the Writ." The abuse
of the writ doctrine "in general prohibits subsequent habeas con-
sideration of claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in -the first
federal habeas proceeding." McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454,
1468 (1991); see also Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-17
(1963); United States v. MacDonald, 966 F.2d 854, 856-59 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 606 (1992); United States v. Oliver,
865 F.2d 600, 604-05 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 830 (1989);
Miller v. Bordenkircher, 764 F.2d 245, 250 (4th Cir. 1985). More-
over, whether a petitioner appeared pro se or was represented by
counsel in the earlier habeas proceeding is generally immaterial to
a court's determination of a Rule 9(b) dismissal. See Miller, 764
F.2d at 251 (Congress did not intend to exclude nonlawyers and
poorly educated from operation of Section 2254's similar Rule 9(b)).
For further discussion of the abuse of the writ doctrine, see supra
paragraph I.E.39.c. and for further discussion of right to counsel
in 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings generally, see supra paragraph
I.E.39.d.
d. Cross Reference. For further discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 2255
proceedings generally, see supra paragraph I.E.39.
54. Probation Revocation. Probation may be revoked when the court
determines that'a condition of probation has been violated which warrants
revocation. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 784 (1973). Whether to revoke probation is within the sound
discretion of the court, which need only be "reasonably satisfied" that a
term or condition has been violated. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216,
222 (1932); United States v. Cates, 402 F.2d 473, 474 (4th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Williams, 378 F.2d 665, 666 (4th Cir. 1967).
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